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Detecting and Modeling Polymorphic Shellcode
Omar Nbou
In this thesis, we address the problem of modeling and detecting polymorphic engines
shellcode. By polymorphic engines, we mean programs having the ability to transform
any piece of malware into many instances consisting of different code but having the same
functionality as the original malware. Typically, polymorphic engines work by encrypting
the target malware using various encryption techniques and providing a decryption module
in order to execute the newly encrypted instance. Moreover, those engines have the ability
to mutate their decryption routine making them unique from one instance to another and
hard to detect. Our analysis focuses on polymorphic shellcode, which is shellcode that
uses a polymorphic engine to mutate while keeping the original function of the code the
same. We propose a new concept of signatures, shape signatures, which cope with the
highly mutated nature of those engines. Those signatures try to identify the constant part
as well as the mutated part of the deciphering routines. This combination is able to cope
with the highly mutated nature of those engines in a much more efficient way compared
to traditional signatures used in most intrusion detection systems. The second part of the
thesis aims at modeling those polymorphic engines by showing that they exhibit common
characteristics. The analysis of bit positions and byte composition of decoders shows us
that polymorphic decoders exhibit a specific byte composition and can be mapped.
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Remote exploitation remains one of the most important threats for information systems
security. The growing number of software programs developed without taking into consid-
eration security aspects, makes code injection attacks a very appealing way for attackers to
compromise systems. A code injection attack can be described as the exploitation of a com-
puter bug caused by the processing of invalid data. The number of vulnerabilities found
in computer programs has become so important that computer industry and researchers
shifted their attention to detecting exploits rather than improving the software programs.
As a consequence, tools such as Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) and anti-
viruses are used to ensure the detection of such abnormalities or exploits. Huge databases
are kept up-to-date for the sake of fingerprinting or generating signatures that can help in
identifying such pieces of malware. The challenge for an attacker is to find and exploit
vulnerabilities as quickly as possible before a signature could be generated. However, at-
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tackers have recently discovered very efficient techniques to evade NIDS and anti-viruses
by developing polymorphic engines. As such, a traditional structure for a buffer overflow
based exploit, consisting of a No Operation Performed section (NOP), a shellcode and a
return address, moves into a new structure consisting of:
• Obfuscated NOP section using multi-argument no-operation instructions
• Decoder or decryption routine (subject to mutation from one instance to another)
• Encrypted shellcode (where the encryption keys are modified from one instance to
another)
• Return address
Thus, known signatures or piece of malware can be easily concealed through the use of a
powerful polymorphic engine. Many approaches are taken when it comes to detect poly-
morphic engines. Some of them focus on detecting the NOP section whereas others draw
attention to detecting the return address in the payload. Models using static binary analysis
and emulation techniques are also used as detection mechanisms as well as signature-based
models. The results are the same for all those detection systems: polymorphic engines
are able to evade them. Hackers are improving their polymorphic algorithms and making
their engines more and more powerful. However, we believe that there is a strong need in
improving the current signature-based detection into models that cope with the new threats
resulting from the use of polymorphic engines. So far, most signature-based detection
models fail against polymorphic engines because they do not take into into account the
polymorphic nature or are not able to express it in their detection mechanism. We strongly
2
believe that the issue for signature-based detection is to implement a signature model that
is able to cope or express that polymorphic nature efficiently. If this condition is fullfilled,
signature-based detection could become very efficient against such engines and could bring
interesting results. In this respect, improvement of detection mechanisms against such en-
gines is becoming challenging and important in the area of malware detection.
1.2 Problem Statement
A polymorphic engine has the ability to generate many instances of the same piece of mal-
ware with a high degree of uniqueness. In other words, all the generated instances look
very different from each other but yet achieve the same functionalities. As a consequence,
the use of traditional signature becomes completely useless against such polymorphic tech-
niques. Song et al. [3] show that in order to cope with such polymorphic behavior, tradi-
tional signature detection system need to model a space in the order of O(28n) sequences.
They extended the analysis by developing two metrics: variation strength and propagation
strength. The former measures the degree of exploration of the byte spectrum, which sim-
ply means measuring the degree of variety in the bytes used from one instance to another.
The latter measures the degree of uniqueness in the instances generated from one poly-
morphic engine. Their results show that most powerful polymorphic engines exhibit high
degrees of variation and propagation strength. As such, we believe that there is a need to
improve the concept of signature in order to better catch the highly mutating nature of those
engines. Obviously, one can conclude that traditional signature detection models (with bit
per bit pattern-matching) are completely useless.
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1.3 Objectives
The main objective of the thesis is to propose a new approach to a more efficient detec-
tion and modeling of polymorphic engines. More specifically, we aim at achieving the
followings:
• Study the state of the art proposals in the area of polymorphic shellcode detection
and modeling
• Propose a new model of signature to better cope with polymorphism
• Elaborate a model based on evolutionary algorithms to extract those signatures
• Validate the proposed approach through experimentation
• Model polymorphic engines by extracting common exhibited characteristics:
– Study the bits positions of the newly extracted signatures to show the possi-
bility of effectively mapping the decoders by locating the areas subject to high
mutation and areas corresponding to the extracted signatures
– Propose experimental approaches in order to validate the conclusions drawn
from studying bit positions
– Analyze the bytes composition to show that each polymorphic engine exhibits
a specific composition that uniquely characterizes it
– Provide experimental results showing repeated patterns in terms of byte com-
position for each engine
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1.4 Contributions
The main contributions of the thesis can be summarized as follows:
• Comparative study of the state of the art techniques in terms of polymorphic shell-
code detection. We identify five main families of detection mechanisms: no-
operational instruction detection, return address detection, static binary code anal-
ysis, emulation-based detection and signature-based detection.
• Proposal of a new model of signatures that better deals with polymorphism tech-
niques. We believe the approach that consists of identifying invariant elements of
polymorphic decoders as well as mutated part is original. In fact, signature-based
detection techniques could be enhanced and should not be exluded.
• Different modeling approaches for polymorphic engines. By different, we mean
characterizing each engine through its byte composition as well as mapping its de-
coders. The mapping consists of showing that we can effectively predict the areas
that are subject to high mutations as well as areas that correspond to the newly gen-
erated signatures.
• Providing new elements about polymorphic engines’ behavior, such as byte compo-
sition characteristics and mapping of their decoders that could constitute new leads
for modeling those engines.
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1.5 Approach
We revise the notion of signature by taking into account the mutation points as well as
the invariant codes. This will lead us to what we call shape signature. The general ap-
proach of the thesis is to develop first a genetic algorithm [16] engine that extracts what we
call shape signatures. By shape signatures, we mean signatures that locate constant parts
as well as mutated parts of polymorphic decoders. Then, we analyze the bit position of
those signatures in order to show that we can map the general shape of polymorphic de-
coders. By mapping, we mean that we can consistently predict the areas of high mutation
as well as the areas containing the shape signatures. The aim is to show that the positions
of those signatures do not occur along the whole decoder. They rather shift in a predefined
area of the decoder. With respect to that, we are able to effectively locate areas along the
decoder that are subject to high mutation as well as area that corresponds to constant pat-
terns. Finally, we analyze the byte occurrences of those polymorphic engines and show that
the same bytes keep repeating themselves. By identifying three main elements, which are
the NOP elements, the byte spectrum, and the other bytes, we identify those polymorphic
decoders in terms of their byte composition by extracting rules of compositions that char-
acterize them. The aim is to show that we can differentiate those polymorphic decoders, in
terms of composition, from a regular NOP section or any random sequence of bytes.
1.6 Research Issues and Results
The main issue, when it comes to signature detection, is to cope with the ability of
polymorphic engines to generate polymorphic decoders that require an order of O(28n)
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sequences to catch all polymorphic behaviors with n being the decoder’s length. We know
from [10, 11, 12, 13] that those engines leave artefacts in their mutation processes due,
mainly, to consistency constraints. By consistency constraint, we mean that no matter how
random the engine might look, it must be consistent by creating polymorphic decoders that
perform their job reliably. From a hacker’s perspective, the challenge is to avoid having a
too long sequence of those invariant codes that could constitute a reliable signature. Having
those two elements in mind, the issue is to come with a model that is able to express them.
It is complex and challenging because the two elements are contradictory and yet they
are related. The methodology that we follow is to extract moulds that better characterize
the polymorphic decoder. Instead of trying to identify all the possible instances that a
polymorphic engine could generate, we look for a higher-level or more abstract model that
can better define all those possible instances. As a consequence, we come with a new model
of signatures called shape signatures that is able to detect constant parts, due to consistency
constraints, and mutated parts due to polymorphism. In this regard, we make use of a
genetic algorithm that is able to extract shape signatures from large sets of polymorphic
decoders. The obtained results are very promising in the sense that the model of shape
signatures holds.
The next step is to find a way to model polymorphic shellcode generated by polymorphic
engines. The modeling of such engines is challenging because similar work is very rare.
Thus having a reliable starting point that we could build on or improve from is key. The
shape signatures could constitute the foundation from which we can elaborate the model-
ing of polymorphic shellcode. As such, we study the bits’ position of the newly extracted
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shape signatures and come to the conclusion that polymorphic decoders could be mapped
effectively. By doing so, we mean that we could predict where the shape signatures ap-
pear, as well as the mutated parts, along the decoder’s space. Our modeling is extended
by analyzing the byte composition of polymorphic decoders. The motivation is to find a
way to characterize those decoders by analyzing their byte spectrums. Our results show
that polymorphic decoders exhibit a constant pattern in their composition allowing us to
recognize them uniquely.
1.7 Organization
In Chapter 2, we present a detailed description of related work on detecting and modeling
polymorphic engines. We propose a classification of such approaches in order to provide
the reader with a better overview of how researchers detect and model polymorphic en-
gines. We also present some of the techniques used by the most powerful polymorphic
engines known until today such as ADMmutate [14], Shikata Ga Nai [15] and Tapion [27].
The aim is to show how hackers improve their evasion techniques. In Chapter 3, we pro-
vide a detailed description on the theory of genetic algorithms. The description is purely
theoretical and will help to familiarize the reader with such evolutionary technique. In
Chapter 4, we define the new concept of shape signature and explain how it relates to ge-
netic algorithms. Therein, we describe in details some of the inner-workings of the engine,
then discuss and validate the obtained shape signatures. Chapter 5 explains how decoders
generated from polymorphic engines can be mapped. By mapping, we mean that we can
consistently predict the areas of high mutation as well as the areas containing the shape sig-
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natures. Chapter 6 is dedicated to composition analysis of decoders generated from those
engines. By composition, we mean examining the byte spectrum produced by polymor-
phic decoders. Finally, some concluding remarks as well as a discussion of future work are





We find various approaches when it comes to analyzing polymorphic engines, more specifi-
cally polymorphic shellcode in the context of a buffer overflow based exploit. The proposed
mechanisms for detecting or modeling such engines use a wide variety of techniques that
are often unrelated. However, we believe that a classification can better summarize how
the problem is approached. In this respect, we have been able to identify five families or
categories:
• NOP section detection: This basically includes techniques for detecting the no-
operation instructions that precede the piece of malware
• Return address detection: It can be summarized as attempts to detect the possible
existence of a return address and thus of an exploit
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• Static binary code analysis: It includes techniques that consist of converting network
data into binaries and then analyze the flow of executed instructions
• Emulation-based detection technique: In this category, network data is transformed
into a binary format that will be executed in a safe environment. During the execu-
tion, attempts are made in order to detect polymorphic behavior
• Signature-based detection: This denotes the technique adopted in this thesis. It in-
volves searching for known malicious patterns in executable code
We aim at describing the major research proposals for each category to give the reader
a better insight of the state of the art in the field. For each description, we detail the
approaches and give their limitations with respect to polymorphic engines.
2.1.1 No-Operational Instruction Detection
Buffer overflow based exploits usually consist of three major sections: the NOP section,
the shellcode section, and the return address. Even though polymorphic shellcode based
exploits present a slightly different structure (with the addition of the decoder routine), the
no-operation section is still present. As a consequence, the detection focuses on identifying
the NOP section since polymorphic techniques are so difficult to model and predict. [17,
18] note in their analysis that the rate of detecting the no-operation section is higher than
the rate of trying to find a signature or analyzing the flow of execution of such malware.
Their results are promising since the NOP section consists of mainly repeating the same
op-code for a certain number of times. Consequently, when having the latter pattern, we
can effectively detect a NOP section. However, the release of ADMmutate polymorphic
11
engine [14] makes this approach completely obsolete since it is found that the number
of x86 no-operation instructions do not consist of only three or four instructions but to
more than sixty instructions. Thus any combination of these instructions could constitute
a NOP section without having to repeat the same instruction. Consequently, the intrusion
detection systems NGSEC [19] and Snort [20] released functionalities incorporating such
instructions, expanding their no-operation instruction library. Based on the new library of
no-operation instructions, they elaborated algorithms to detect the occurrence of such in-
structions and thus the NOP section. Initially the results were promising until the discovery
of multi-argument no-operation instructions [21]. Basically, it is a no-operation instruction
that takes arguments. The arguments could be any piece of byte, even though they do not
belong to the NOP library. Having regular instructions inserted between sequences of no
operation instructions, the NOP section is completely obfuscated. The detection of these
instructions fail since it becomes impossible to identify a sequence of contiguous NOP
instructions. Consequently, the no-operational instruction detection becomes impossible
when dealing with multi-argument NOPs.
2.1.2 Return Address Detection
The second category deals with detecting the return address part for buffer overflow based
exploits. The idea is interesting in the sense that it assumes that the range of addresses
for a process, when executed, lies in specific areas of the memory. As such, Buttercap [1]
aims at performing such detection technique by identifying the range of possible return
memory addresses for existing buffer-overflow vulnerabilities. However, the method has
12
many limitations:
• It relies heavily on the target operating system. In fact, the techniques for complet-
ing an exploit differ from one operating system to another, thus, implementing such
detection mechanism is challenging.
• In some cases, the completion of an exploit does not require the use of a return
address as it is the case for Windows-based systems. SEH based exploits [22] are a
perfect example.1
• All new versions of Linux, Windows and Mac respective operating systems come
with Address Space Layout Randomization2 (ASLR) [23]. As a consequence, new
ranges of addresses have to be considered and explored making the detection prone
to false positives.
• ASLR is created in order to make the guess of the return address in the presence
of vulnerable programs nearly impossible. However, new exploitation techniques
beating the ASLR exist. Thus, the range of address to consider is even bigger and
hard to predict leading to an increase of both false positives and false negatives in the
detection.
We come to the conclusion that such an approach is very hard to implement, consequently,
its efficiency is highly questionable.
1SEH: Structured Exception Handlers are exceptions that a program cannot handle itself, then control is
passed to a SEH address that has code that can be used to show a dialog box explaining that the program has
crashed
2ASLR: technique which involves randomly arranging the positions of key data areas such as the base of
the executable, position of libraries, heap, and stack, in a process’s address space
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2.1.3 Static Binary Code Analysis
Before addressing the topic of static binary code analysis, it is important to mention that
we do not intend to question its efficiency. Static binary code analysis is indeed a powerful
method for analyzing binaries. Having seen the inefficiency of previous approaches (No-
operational instruction detection and return address detection), some initiatives considered
treating polymorphic shellcode as executables or binaries. As a consequence, static binary
code analysis is considered as a reliable technique to perform such task. In such approach,
disassembling techniques are used in order to transform network data into binary code. The
control flow of the code is then analyzed statically in order to detect patterns or features that
could characterize polymorphic shellcode behavior. By static, we mean that the translated
binary is not executed. The approach is restricted to analyzing the disassembled binary.
Consequently Payer et al. [6], Chinchani et al. [25] and Kruegel et al, [26] developed
interesting mechanisms performing such tasks. However, the process of translation is itself
very challenging. In fact, most of the time, the conversion from network data into binaries is
prone to errors making the conclusions that could be drawn from such detection techniques
highly questionable. Moreover, powerful polymorphic engines implement techniques that
resist static analysis such as self-modifying code. In fact, Polychronakis et al. [4] give a
complete description on how static binary code analysis could be easily evaded.
2.1.4 Emulation-Based Detection
It is important to mention that we do not challenge the efficiency of emulation-based tech-
niques but rather question their efficiency in detecting polymorphic shellcode. In order to
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defeat static analysis evasion techniques of polymorphic shellcode, emulation-based detec-
tion is proposed as an enhancement of the previous approach. Polychronakis et al. [4] are
the first to propose such detection. Their approach differs from the previous ones in the
sense that they do not stop to the translation from network data to binaries and the anal-
ysis of the disassembled binary. In addition. they execute the binary resulting from the
translation in a safe environment and try to identify polymorphic shellcode behavior from
the execution. Such approach faces many problems in the context of polymorphic shell-
code detection. The process of emulation itself presents many problems. The most obvious
one is the risk of facing infinite loops when trying to emulate the execution of the newly
translated binaries. Most of the time, the newly translated binaries do not correspond, in
reality, to executable code leading to many bugs and inconsistencies in the execution. Of-
ten the inconsistencies result in infinite loops during the execution. Moreover, there is real
difficulty in identifying where the polymorphic shellcode starts and where it stops. As a
consequence, we can question the reliability of conclusions that can be drawn from such
an approach. The second problem faced with this detection is the ability for polymorphic
engines to evade it. We mention just some few evasion techniques to show the flaws that
can be faced with emulation detection. As we have mentioned previously, there is a risk
with emulation to face infinite loops. One solution proposed by Lanjua et al. [7] and Zang
et al. [28] consists in imposing a threshold limiting the number of executed instructions
so that infinite loops are avoided. Consequently, the implementation of endless but actu-
ally finite loop in the shellcode can evade such detection. Thus, before the shellcode is
detected, the execution ends, causing a false negative. Moreover, a way of detecting poly-
morphic shellcode behavior, using emulation, is the decoding process. When the decoding
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routine is launched, the decryption process is done at regular time interval revealing a de-
coding behavior that could be detected. Tapion [27], as an example, possesses a decryption
mechanism involving a random CPU time usage. Moreover, most powerful polymorphic
engines have techniques that involve executing the shellcode in a random fashion disturb-
ing the flow of execution. Thus, possible analysis of shellcode behavior using emulation is
highly questionable. For these reasons, we believe that emulation based detection is not a
reliable solution in order to deal with polymorphic shellcode.
2.1.5 Signature-Based Detection
This category is close to the approach adopted in this thesis. In the following, we present
and discuss some related research proposals. In this setting, it is to mention the result
proposed by Song et al. [3] on the impossibility of detecting and modeling polymorphic
shellcode using conventional signatures. Their work is important in the sense that it is
the most successful attempt in understanding and quantifying the strength of polymorphic
shellcode. In this paper, the authors present a quantitative analysis of the strengths and
limitations of polymorphic shellcode. They also consider the impact of this analysis on the
current practices in intrusion detection. Their analysis provides a new and useful way to
understand the limitations of the current generation of signature-based techniques. Con-
sequently, the authors developed two metrics: variation strength and propagation strength
in order to quantify the strength of a polymorphic engine. The first metric measures the
degree of exploration of the byte spectrum, which simply means measuring the degree of
variety in the bytes used from one instance to another. The second metric measures the
16
degree of uniqueness in the instances generated from one polymorphic engine. The au-
thors state that most powerful polymorphic engines exhibit high degrees of variation and
propagation strength. Based on that, they come to the conclusion that current generation
of signature-based techniques are limited and inadequate for detecting polymorphic shell-
code. As stated by Song et al. in [3], we need to model a space in the order of O(28n)
sequences to cope with polymorphism. In fact, better models of signatures should be pro-
posed in order to deal with the high degree of mutation of polymorphic shellcode. Our
motivations are based on the fact that even when they mutate, polymorphic engines leave
artefact making them potentially subject to detection. Moreover, the created polymorphic
decoders must be consistent by performing their task which is decoding the encrypted shell-
code. Consequently, any technique or attempt to make the decoder look highly random or
polymorphic is greatly reduced by this consistency constraint. Finally, the mutation tech-
niques themselves are subject to detection. Based on that, a model of signature that takes
into consideration the possible mutating zone and the constant part is able to effectively
express the behavior of a polymorphic engine. The polymorphic characteristic is expressed
through the mutating part and the constraint of consistency is expressed through the con-
stant part. The conclusions drawn concerning the ability of polymorphic engines to possess
high variation and propagation strengths are valid. However, the analysis should also take
into consideration the fact that perfectly polymorphic decoder cannot be created because
of the consistency constraints that we have mentioned before. The authors assume the
existence of perfect polymorphic decoders in the algorithms they used in their genetic al-
gorithms techniques without taking into consideration that there is a constraint factor. In
other words, the decoders must be consistent in the sense that they must perform their work
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as decoders. Consequently, any attempt to make the decoder look polymorphic is subject
to those constraints reducing the performance (in terms of making the decoder look poly-
morphic). Otherwise, the generated sequences of bytes will not make any sense since they
will correspond to random instructions without any meaning or task. This constraint factor
is not taken into consideration in the experiments conducted in [3]. We believe the experi-
ments could have been more reliable by not even touching the decoders sequence of bytes
and just analyzing them as they are. In this respect, our analysis draws much important
conclusions in order to model polymorphic decoders. For these reasons, signature-based
detection and modeling of polymorphic shellcode should not be abandoned.
Autograph [10] is a tool for signature generation against worms. It basically consists
of two main phases: a first phase called suspicious flow selection and a second phase
called signature generation. We elaborate more on the second phase since it is the one
related to signature-based detection. However, we quickly describe the first phase to give
an insight on its semantics. The first phase aims at identifying meaningful data to analyze.
Basically, it acts as a filter to detect network packets that correspond to a worm behavior.
The focus is on successful flows from IPs that make unsuccessful connection to more than
S destinations. In other words, it identifies the scanning functionality proper to all worms.
Autograph relies on the assumption that worms should exhibit common byte patterns that
uniquely identify them. Based on this, the suspicious flows identified from the first phase
are divided into small blocks. Each small block is ranked according to its occurrences; the
higher is the occurrence, the higher is the prevalence. Obviously, this process becomes very
ineffective against worms encoding their contents using a polymorphic engine since finding
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such common patterns is itself challenging for highly polymorphic engine. Moreover, the
use of traditional pattern matching is not suited against polymorphic engines. We will show
in the sequel that our shape signatures are much more effective against those engines.
Honeycomb [11] is a complex system for automating the process of signature generation
for Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). It applies pattern-matching techniques
and protocol conformance checks on many levels of the protocol hierarchy. We are not
elaborating on the honeycomb architecture but we focus on the algorithms used in their
pattern matching for the sake of generating attack signatures. The signature creation algo-
rithm operates in the following manner. For each incoming packets, the following steps are
executed:
• The connection state is checked for the new packet: when a connection exists, the
state is updated; otherwise, a new state is created.
• The type of packet is verified: when the packet is outbound, the process stops; other-
wise, the process continues.
• A protocol analysis is then performed at both the network and transport layers for
IP, TCP and UDP headers. The analysis aims at detecting anomalies that correspond
to misbehavior. The techniques used for detection of such abnormal traffic are com-
mon ones used by all NIDS. Once the packet is identified as abnormal, an analysis
signature is created at this point.
• For each stored connection or each previous recorded packets:
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– Honeycomb [11] compares the header to match possible IP addresses, TCP
sequence numbers, common destination ports, etc. In other words, any infor-
mation that might relate the packet to a previous connection is investigated.
– Once a connection is found, Honeycomb performs pattern detection on the data
part or the exchange messages for a possible final signature.
As we can see, there are many problems that can be stated for the system such as the re-
liability of how packets are related to each other but at this point, we solely focus on the
pattern detection technique used by Honeycomb. Pattern matching is based on the LCS
algorithm [54] (Longest Common Subsequence). The whole issue is to know if the LCS
algorithm is effective against polymorphic engines. The LCS is very efficient in finding
common parts exhibited by a polymorphic engine. However, if the engine is very polymor-
phic, those common parts tend to be very small and sparse. Thus, it becomes ineffective
when generating a reliable signature.
Polygraph [12] is a framework for generating signature attacks against polymorphic
worms. We believe that this framework is the closest one, in its approach and design,
to our work. The main architecture of Polygraph is discussed briefly as we focus on the
way signatures are generated rather than the whole framework. The architecture consists
of a network tap, which is deployed at a key point of a network such as a bridge point that
links a network to the Internet. Then, traffic passes through a flow classifier that converts
reassembled flows into contiguous byte flows. The next phase consists in analyzing the
recorded traffic so that the suspicious flows are distinguished from the innocent ones. The
distinction is based on detection techniques used by regular NIDS. The next phase is the
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core of the framework, which is the Polygraph signature generator. As we have mentioned
previously, we are not going into the details of how the data is gathered. Let us investigate
the algorithms used in order to perform pattern matching. Polygraph relies on three main
techniques for signature generation:
• Conjunction signatures
• Token subsequence signature
• Bayes signature
The conjunction signatures consist of extracting all common tokens or chunks of bytes for
the gathered data without taking into consideration the order in which they appear (their
relative order). These tokens are labeled as the first phase signatures. The used algorithm
is the Smith-Waterman local sequence alignment [55] for alignment issues. The next phase
consists of the token subsequence signature. It uses the previously extracted tokens and
tries to identify an order in which the tokens appear. Finally, the last phase of the algorithm
is the creation of Bayes signatures. In this phase, each token is associated with a score and
an overall threshold. These signatures exhibits the following probabilities:
• The probability that the token is in the suspicious flow
• The probability that the token is in the innocent flow
In our opinion, the pattern extraction mechanism used by Polygraph is the most efficient
one among the signature-based detection mechanisms, especially the ability to try to find
a sequence, or an order, in which the tokens appear. However, Polygraph fails in detect-
ing highly polymorphic engines or worms for the following reasons. The algorithm relies
21
heavily on the first phase of extracting common tokens. If the engine is highly polymorphic
those tokens are very small in size and important in number. Knowing that highly poly-
morphic engines are using the whole byte spectrum, the number of common tokens is very
high. Consequently, the signatures generated lead to many false positives when used in the
detection process, and Polygraph is unable to extract a reliable pattern.
Hamsa [13] is a network-based automated signature generation system for polymorphic
worms. Hamsa , like most signature-based detection frameworks, looks for invariant se-
quences of polymorphic malware. Even though, the algorithm for token extraction is quite
similar to Polygraph [12], Hamsa differentiates itself in the sense that it looks for executable
code instead of byte strings. In other words, it is not a simple token extraction, the engine
tries to analyze the extracted tokens and see if they correspond to something meaningful.
The basic steps that the engine goes through are the following:
• Extract the basic blocks
• Generate the corresponding Control Flow Graph (CFG)3
• Color the code on each node of the CFG
• Records fingerprints into a table
• If the number of fingerprints exceeds a certain threshold, they are identified as mal-
ware code
3CFG: In a control flow graph each node in the graph represents a straight-line piece of code without any
jumps or jump targets. Directed edges are used to represent jumps in the control flow.
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However, we can see that hamsa encounters the same problems as Polygraph [12]. When
encountering a highly polymorphic engine, those tokens tend to be very small and impor-
tant in number as stated previously. Highly polymorphic engines are using the whole byte
spectrum, and so the number of common tokens is very high. Consequently, the number of
fingerprints generated tends to increase leading to a high rate of false positives.
To summarize, most of signature-based detection mechanisms rely heavily on the invari-
ant codes that polymorphic engines are subject to. We believe the idea to be relevant in
the sense that those invariant codes come from the consistency constraint that polymorphic
shellcode needs to fulfill. However, attackers are also aware of this observation. Accord-
ingly, they implement engines that aim at inserting highly mutating code in between those
invariant codes. This makes the detection mechanism useless, at best, subject to a high
rate of false positive. We believe that the concept of signatures needs to be improved by
incorporating signatures that detect invariant codes as well as mutated zones.
2.2 Polymorphic Engines
This thesis focuses on the most powerful polymorphic engines that are known so far. Our
choice is based on the work done by Song et al. [3] since it is the only known work that
has been successfuk in quantifying and measuring polymorphic engines. We also take into
account the latest developments done in the area of polymorphic engines. In this regard,
the choices come down to the following three engines: Tapion [27], Shikata Ga Nai [15]
and ADMmutate [14]. In this section, we survey these three engines and the techniques that
23
are used in order to make them polymorphic.
Tapion [27] was created by Piotr Bania to avoid code detection. It is probably, so far, the
most powerful polymorphic engine since it incorporates a wide panel of evasion techniques.
More specifically, it is the only engine possessing the ability to evade emulation-based
techniques. Whereas the other two engines are resistant to most detection mechanisms,
they do not possess functionalities designed to evade emulation-based detection. Its main
techniques of polymorphism are the following:
• The decryption key is generated in a random fashion
• There is a swapping of shellcode blocks or pieces
• The decoder’s length is constantly changing from one instance to another
• It uses multiple decryptor layers, thus performing the decryption of the shellcode as
well as some of its decoder parts
• There is garbage padding in between instructions in order to prevent the detection of
long invariants codes
• The garbage padding is unpredictable or random
• It uses random register in order to prevent detection. This is an important feature
since many polymorphic engines are very often vulnerable to signature detection
because of register usage
• Anti-emulation techniques are used such as performing decryption at random inter-
vals and pseudo-infinite loops
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The next engine is Shikata Ga Nai[15]. It is the official polymorphic engine of the Metas-
ploit framework [15] for its shellcode generator. It exhibits the following features:
• It uses a polymorphic XOR additive feedback encoding against a four byte key
• The key is chosen according to a context-key selection. In other words, a memory
map is created and then a sequence of bytes is selected from it to fit the desired
key-length
• It uses dynamic instruction substitution and dynamic block ordering. The aim is to
create on-the-fly decoders that look different from one instance to another
• Permutations of about 1.3 millions are used by the engine from one instance to an-
other
• It selects dynamically the registers
The last engine, namely ADMmutate[14] was developed by the so-called ADM CREW.
It is one of the breakthrough in polymorphic engines since it is the first ,historically, to
implement new generation of polymorphic techniques that constitute the basic foundations
for all the newly implemented polymorphic engines. It uses the following main techniques:
• Non-operational padding: which is padding of NOP instruction in between instruc-
tions. The padding is done using various non-operational instructions (being single or
multi-byte argument), making them appear random and immune to possible pattern
detection
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• Out-of-order decoder generation: specifying where certain core instructions may be
located in the decoder. This is mainly done by extending or reducing the length of
the decoder to shift the bit positions of those operational instructions
• Random generation of instructions: randomly selecting instructions without disturb-
ing the execution flow. This allows to explore the whole byte spectrum preventing
the use of the same instructions from one instantiation to another. It also prevents
against static binary code analysis as well as emulation detection
• Random key selection: selecting randomly keys, thus avoiding any prediction on how
keys and offsets are selected
In summary, we described the main techniques of polymorphism used by the aformen-
tioned engines. It is important to notice that each of these engines perform its own mutation
techniques even tough at the end the goal is the same which is creating polymorphic de-
coders capable of evading detection.
2.3 Conclusion
Polymorphic engines constitute a real threat in the sense that they are able to defeat various
types of detection mechanisms. Whether using network detection, emulation techniques
or any of the discussed mechanisms, hackers always find ways to improve evasion tech-
niques. Consequently, it is important not to drop any of the discussed mechanisms but
rather improve them in order to cope with polymorphic engines. Most importantly, it ap-




In this section, we discuss the main elements that compose any Genetic Algorithm (GA)
[16]. Moreover,we will discuss how these concepts will be applied in this thesis. Genetic
algorithms is a popular technique in evolutionary computation trying to emulate the natural
process of evolution. It is an established technique that is known to be efficient in heuristic
search problems. The main challenge in the use of GA is to adequately define the problem.
In our case, the problem consists in finding a common pattern for a given population of
decoders for a specific polymorphic engine. Our choice is motivated by the fact that poly-
morphic engines behave like entities in nature. They are able to generate from a common
basis multiple instances. During the process of instantiation, the generated entities are sub-
ject to mutations making them unique in terms of bytes. Yet, those same entities belong or
come from the same polymorphic engine.
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3.1 Main Components
GA have two distinct elements: the individuals and the populations. An individual rep-
resents a single solution whereas a population represents the set of individuals currently
involved in the search process. A chromosome can be seen as the raw genetic information
of an individual (its genotype) that can be decomposed into genes. Figure 3.1 illustrates
a representation of a chromosome (encoded by bit strings); genes are the subdivisions or
building blocks that form the chromosome.
Figure 3.1: Chromosome Representation in Binary
Genes are in fact the basic instructions for building a GA whereas a chromosome rep-
resents a sequence of genes. They are bit string of arbitrary lengths. Each individual in a
GA can be valued or quantified by a fitness function. The fitness function is the value of
an objective function to indicate how good the individual is, as well as how close he is to
the optimal one. A population is a collection of individuals that are going to be evaluated
according to the criterion defined by the fitness function. A population has two important
aspects that must be considered:
• The initial population generation
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• The population size
For each problem, the size of the population depends on the complexity of the defined
problem that needs to be solved. In theory, the initial population should have a large pool
of genes in order to explore the whole search space. All the possible combination of genes
should be present. Consequently, the initial population is often chosen randomly. In our
case, polymorphic engines claims to generate such randomness, thus solving the problem
of exploring the whole search space. In fact, Song et al. [3] have shown that a powerful
polymorphic engine (which is the case of the chosen engines) is able to effectively explore
the whole byte spectrum. On the other hand, our fitness function tries to identify common
patterns to each gene in their reproduction process. In this respect, we can have a glimpse
of the main components that will compose the genetic algorithm engine for shape signature
extraction.
The encoding is another important aspect of GA. It deals with representing each in-
dividual gene according to a specific alphabet. Since we are dealing with shellcode, an
appropriate representation of the genes is the hexadecimal alphabet (0-9, A-F). Figure 3.2
gives us an idea of how the chromosomes (which corresponds to shellcode) are encoded.
Figure 3.2: Chromosome Representation in Hexadecimal
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3.2 Breeding
The breeding process is the core engine of GA. Through this process, the search creates
new possible fitter individuals. Three steps characterize it:
1. Parents’ selection
2. Crossing of parents to create new individuals
3. Creating the new population by replacing the old individuals by the new ones
Once the process terminates, the newly created population inherits characteristics from the
previous one. The most important idea to keep in mind is that the genetic information is
passed on from one generation to another in the breeding process.
3.2.1 Selection
Selection consists of choosing parents from the population for crossing or reproduction.
The purpose of the selection is to focus on fitter individuals hoping that their offsprings
(childs generated from the reproduction process) have higher fitness. The method randomly
selects chromosomes from the population according to their fitness values. The higher the
fitness, the more chances an individual has to be selected. The selection pressure is the
degree of how much we favor the best individuals (the ones with the highest fitness values).
In other words, it is the threshold set, in terms of fitness value, for deciding which individ-
uals are selected for reproduction. One important issue in selection is the convergence rate
of GA, which depends largely on the selection pressure value. The convergence rate ex-
presses how close we are towards finding the solution. The higher the selection pressure is,
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the higher the convergence rates are. The problem is that high selection pressure results in
quick convergence toward a solution that might be wrong. A low selection pressure results
in a low convergence rate slowing down the GA by generating unnecessarily time to find
the optimal solution.
Two types of selection schemes can be distinguished: proportionate selection and
ordinal-based selection. Proportionate selection picks out individuals based upon their
relative fitness selection. On the other hand, ordinal-based selection selects individuals
based on their rank within a population. As a consequence, a predefined threshold must be
defined in order to decide which individuals must be selected.
3.2.2 Crossover
The crossover is the process of taking two parents and producing a child from them. In
other words, it is a reproduction process. After the reproduction, the child goes through
a selection process that determines its fitness or ability to live for the next rounds. The
crossover can be defined (roughly) in three steps:
1. Random selection of two individuals as parents
2. Selection of a crossing sites along the string length
3. The position values are swapped between the two strings in a random fashion
In fact, there are many techniques of crossover (single point, two point, n-points, etc). In
our case, we use an n-points crossover with constant crossing points. Consequently, we
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choose to cross the string every n-bit as we will explain latter in this thesis. Figure 3.3
illustrates the concept of crossover using a single point crossover.
Figure 3.3: Single-Point Crossover
3.2.3 Replacement
The last stage of the breeding process is the replacement. The reproduction process ends
up with four individuals: the two parents and the two offsprings. However, not all of them
can constitute the new population. We need to determine which individuals goes through
the next rounds. We can clearly see that the way we replace individuals, determines the con-
vergence of the solutions. In fact, there are many replacements techniques but they all fall
into two main categories: generational updates and steady state updates. The generational
update consists of generating N children from a population of N parents to form the next
population at the next stage. We replace all the old population with the new one making
inter-generational reproduction impossible. The second family of replacement techniques
is steady state updates where new individuals are inserted into the new population instead
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of completely erasing the old population.
As a conclusion, these are the main elements that constitute a genetic algorithm engine.
We can already see that our problem can fit into this type of evolutionary algorithms. In
the next section, we describe John Hollands schema theorem [29]. The aim is to show
how effective the genetic information is passed and how effective we could be in finding
patterns. The schema is also important since it is a kind of introduction into the concept of
shape signatures.
3.3 Schema Theorem
The schema theorem is based on John Hollands schema theorem [16, 29] which describes
a scheme as a template for describing a subset of chromosomes with similar sections. The
schema consists of bits or hexadecimal characters and meta-characters (wildcards). The
schema is a kind of template for describing similarities among patterns in chromosomes.
Holland derived an expression that describes the extent at which those schemata are passed
from one generation to another. A good schema propagates in next generations in an in-
creasing fashion. As a consequence, schemata that are low-order well-defined and above
average fitness are preferred and constitute building blocks of the GA.
A schema is a similarity template describing subset of string displaying similarities at
certain positions. In our case, it is formed by the following ternary alphabet 0-9, A-F,
X with X being a wildcard allowing the description of all possible similarities among
string of a particular length and alphabet. The GA model in schema theory is based
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on proportionate selection in which the probability of selecting a solution in a current
population is proportional to its fitness. The schema theorem is called the Fundamental
Theorem of Genetic Algorithm. For a given schema H , let:
- m(H, t) be the relative frequency of the schema H in the population of the tth generation
- F (H) be the mean fitness of the elements of H
- O(H) be the number of fixed bits in the schema H , called the order of the schema
- σ(H) be the distance between the first and the last fixed bits of the schema called the
definition length of the schema
- f is the mean fitness of the current population
- Pc is the crossover probability
- Pm is the mutation probability
- l is the length of the code
Then:
E[m(H, t+ 1)] ≥ m(H, t)F (H)
f
[1− Pcσ(H)
l − 1 −O(H)Pm]
The main information that can be derived from the schema theorem formula is that the
number of individuals matching a schema H grows at each time step like the ratio of the
fitness F (H) and the mean fitness of the current population f . Consequently, an above
average schema, i.e, a schema with F (H) > f , will proliferate successfully in the next
generation. At the opposite, a below average schema will not.
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If we relate the formula to polymorphic engines, we can consider a schema as a potential
pattern. If we use a traditional signature matching mechanism, a pattern must match a
polymorphic decoder’s portion bit per bit. Knowing from Song et al.[3] that polymorphic
decoders exhibit a high variation and propagation rate, we expect to get F (H) < f since
the diversity and uniqueness of generated shellcode is so high that the schemata are always
below average. Consequently, those schemata are not able to proliferate resulting on the
impossibility to generate a signature for a polymorphic decoder. On the other hand, if
we change the model of signature by trying to detect the mutation points by considering
wildcards in the pattern and the constant points, we are able to increase the fitness of the
schema leading to potential above average schemata (with F (H) > f ). Thus, they are able
to proliferate and candidate signatures could be found.
3.4 Conclusion
Genetic algorithms offer a convinient way of studying and representing polymoprhic de-
coders. The way genetic information is passed (in our case, the genetic information is
mainly the byte) allows us to extract possible common patterns for each polymorphic en-
gine. The search heuristic property of GA is very useful for search problem. In our case,
the challenge is to look for common patterns. In the case of polymorphic engines, the
addition of meta-characters with regular hexadecimal characters makes the extraction of
shape signatures accuurate and precise where constant parts can be represented by regular
hexadecimal characters whereas mutated part can be represented by wildcard characters.
This model of signature is potentialy able to generate above average schemata compared to
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In this chapter, we detail the functioning of the genetic algorithm engine and how it
allows us to extract the shape signatures. Our starting point is the fact that polymorphic en-
gines, even when they mutate, leave artefacts making them potentially subject to detection.
[10, 11, 12, 13] have shown the validity of such assumption. Moreover, those engines must
obey the structure of assembly language by decoding the encrypted shellcode properly.
Thus, any polymorphism technique attempt to make the decoder look highly random is
greatly reduced by the consistency constraint. Finally, the mutation techniques themselves
are subject to detection. In order to evade detection mechanism based on traditional signa-
ture detection, highly polymorphic engines pad mutated zones in between those potentially
detectable parts and constantly change their byte positions. Consequenty, signature-based
detection work done so far [10, 11, 12, 13] is either failing at extracting signatures or having
too small tokens leading to a high false-positives. Based on this, we define a new concept
of signature called shape signatures. This type of signatures takes into consideration, in
their detection mechanism, the possible mutated zone and the constant part. We believe
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that this combination is able to effectively express the behavior of a polymorphic engine by
taking into account their high polymorphism (through the mutated part) and the constraint
of consistency (the constant part). We are able to explore the whole decoder space by using
GA. Thus, even with a shift of bit position, we are still able to detect potential patterns.
The way signatures are extracted through our GA engine is explained in details in 4.3. Be-
fore detailing the engine, it is important to stress the fact that we are basically dealing with
two families of polymorphic engine: fixed-length decoder engines and changing length de-
coder engines. They both rely on the same pattern extraction technique but present some
differences regarding the crossing point selection. In the next section, we present the com-
mon points between the two engines and explain the differences when dealing with both
families.
4.1 Population Generation
Our detection is based on the deciphering engine. Consequently, we select a well-known
polymorphic engine and run it against a single shellcode. Knowing the size of the shellcode,
we extract from the output generated by the engine the deciphering part and store it in a
file. If the engine generates various length deciphering decoders or adds jumps or padding,
we do not alter the obtained output to preserve the genetic information carried by each
member of the population of decoders. By doing so, we get a large-size population of
deciphering routines for a specific polymorphic engine. This constitutes the input or initial
population. The binary representation for the GA is obviously an hexadecimal one (since
we are dealing with shellcodes). The decoders are the chromosomes for the GA. Assuming
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the polymorphic engine is for example Shikata Gai Nai[15], we call P the population
generated from it. Accordingly P = {D1, D2, D3, . . . , Dn} where Dm is a decoder and n
the size of the population. At each epoch, reproduction must occur through crossovers and
recombination. To this end, we need to define what type of crossover is used and how the
recombination occurs. After each epoch, the fitness function evaluates each individual and
proceeds with the selection and replacement of population. The next sections are dedicated
to the detailed explanation of how these steps are executed. For each polymorphic engine,
we generate a set of 1000 decoders. Based on that initial population set, we extract the
signatures. We can observe the strength of a polymorphic engines by only generating very
few instances of polymorphic shellcode and compare their differences. At the same time,
we need to evaluate their full strength by generating an important number of instances.
Consequently, we believe the number 1000 to be a good compromise between performance
and evaluation. For experimental testing, we create three new sets of 1000, three sets of
5000 and three new sets of 10000 decoders in order to validate the various results we come
across.
4.2 Genetic Algorithm for Signature Detection
In this section, we detail how the genetic algorithm engine works with respect to our
problem, which is the extraction of valid shape signatures. We detail the crossover process,
then describe how the reproduction and recombination phase are executed. Afterwards, we
define the fitness function of the GA and explain the selection and replacement phases.
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4.2.1 Crossover
Since the size of the decoders is relatively important, especially when an hexadecimal
encoding is used, we need multiple crossover points. Those multiple crossover points gen-
erate the building blocks for reproduction, and thus, for signature detection. The motiva-
tion behind the use of multiple crossovers is closely related to the Schema Theorem [29],
which states that good schemata with short definition length propagate and grow rapidly
in the population. Usually, when a crossover (being single point or n-point) is chosen, the
crossing point tends to be random across the decoder at each iteration. In our case, this
randomness leads to invalid genes or building blocks. Indeed, if the crossing point is cho-
sen randomly at each round, we end up with sequences of bytes mixing with each other.
Consequently, the generated genes do not make sense semantically. By defining a n-point
crossover with fixed crossing point, we generate genes that remain the same across rounds
preserving their semantics. In other words, at each round, the same crossing point is chosen
for each chromosome in the current population (at each n bits, we choose a crossing point
at that position). Let D1 ∈ P and L1 be the length of D1 where D1 is a decoder from a
population P . Let m be the crossing point length with m < L1. Accordingly, a crossing
point at each m bits is defined in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: N-Point Crossing Points for a Chromosome
To illustrate the inability of using random crossing points, let consider two decoders D1
and D2 of the same length. In this example, we use a single-point crossover and assume the
selection and the fitness evaluation to occur at epoch 0. The two chromosomes go through
the process of reproduction and recombine to produce two offsprings. Figure 4.2 illustrates
how the use of random crossing point leads to the creation of non-logical chromosomes.
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Figure 4.2: Random Crossing-Points Effects
In summary, if the crossing point keeps changing, we end up with non-logical build-
ing blocks. This because the shellcode chunks keeps mixing with one another and so the
detection of patterns becomes impossible. Thus, it is important to keep the crossing point
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constant to generate logical building blocks for the reproduction. We can then work on
them in order to extract common patterns that might exist. In our GA engine, the user is
asked to input the crossing point. Usually, a crossing point of length m such that m is
approximately one fourth of L (where L is the decoder’s length) is a good candidate for the
pattern extraction or signature detection. This choice is justified by the following reasons.
According to Song et al. [3], in average no more than
1
3
of any polymorphic decoder is
subject to transformation or mutations. We have also to recall the schema theorem [16,
29] property stating that low-order, well-defined average fitness schemata will combine to
form high-order, above order fitness schemata. By taking into account those two factors,
we have come to the conclusion that a crossing point of length m ≡ L
4
, with L being the
decoder’s length, is an appropriate choice.
4.2.2 Reproduction and Recombination
In this section, we detail how the reproduction and recombination processes occur. We
also describe the reproduction sequence generation, the process of parents’ selection for
pairing and the reproduction process itself.
4.2.2.1 Reproduction Sequence
Our N -points crossing technique generates logical building blocks that are used for the
reproduction, recombination and evaluation process. The next question that remains is
how the reproduction and thus the recombination occur. Let Dn and Dm be two elements
belonging to a population P of decoders. Let m be the crossing point length for the engine.
The two decoders are assumed to be of the same length. It is important to mention that
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some polymorphic engines generate various length shellcodes. Consequently, we need to
transform the GA [16] into a Fast Messy Genetic Algorithm (FMGA) [30]. The latter
algorithm is detailed in section 4.5. Being fixed or variable length decoder engine, the
reproduction/recombination process deals with decoders using a unified length. After that,
a sequence of reproduction must be defined.
Our reproduction algorithm performs the following operations. At each epoch or round,
a random reproduction sequence is generated for the given population. Our function repro-
duction sequence takes as input the number of building blocks or genes generated using the
N -points crossover, let call it N . It creates a N ×N matrix with the indexes referencing to
the genes for both parents. Whenever a value of 1 is encountered in the matrix, the corre-
sponding genes must be associated. It randomly creates the reproduction sequence between
genes. It is important to mention that all the genes are used only once in the recombination.
Let Dn and Dm be the parents and m be the crossing point. We generate N genes for each
parent. Let A = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1} and B = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1} be two arrays repre-
senting the indexes of genes for the parents used for reproduction. Each time we select an
index for a parent, the corresponding genes is retrieved from the pool of selection. At the
end, all the genes are used and paired together to produce two offsprings. The reproduction
of two parents results always in two offsprings. This is justified by the fact that we want to
increase the accuracy of the signature or pattern detection by using all the genes from each
decoder or chromosome and not just some chunks. The generated reproduction sequence




At each epoch or round, we need to select who is going to reproduce with whom. We
assume at this stage that the selection, using the fitness function has occurred. Once the
reproduction sequence has been produced, a function called pairing, which takes as in-
put the population at the corresponding epoch, is responsible for pairing the parents ac-
cording to the produced reproduction sequence. The function generates a pool of in-
dexes POOL = {0, 1, 2, . . . , S} where S is the size of the population. Indexes are
picked up randomly and removed from the pool. Afterwards, they are used to generate
a long sequence called PAIRING until the pool is emptied. If S is an even number, then
PAIRING = 〈p1, p2, p3, . . . , pS〉. If S is odd, then PAIRING = 〈p1, p2, p3, . . . , pS+1〉where
pi is a random index from POOL. Afterwards, we generate the pairs of parents for repro-
duction by taking each two index successively from the pairing sequence resulting in re-
production pairs (pi, pi+1). At the end, all members or individuals from the population are
melting together; it is important to make sure that none of the individuals from a population
in a certain epoch is missed.
4.2.2.3 Reproduction
At this point, we have the reproduction sequence as well as the pairing sequence. The
next phase is to perform the reproduction. The reproduction sequence determines how the
genes are mixed together in order to produce a new offspring. The pairing sequence deter-




The fitness function is the core element of the engine, since it constitutes the basis for
the selection process when moving from one epoch to another. As such, the solution can-
didates are selected at the end of the GA to give us the final signatures or patterns. The
fitness function is based on the schema theorem [29]. Consequently, it deals with the
following alphabet: {0, 1, . . . , 9} × {A,B, . . . , F} × {X} where X is a wildcard. The
fitness function is based on a sliding window technique. The fitness function works on
the genes or building blocks generated from the reproduction. Our engine must be able
to detect patterns among new offsprings based on the ternary alphabet described earlier.
This pattern should be able to detect changing parts of shellcode chunks as well as fixed
parts. The fitness function takes as input a population of decoders. For each single de-
coder, the function works on its building blocks generated from the reproduction Let D
be an individual from a population P at an epoch n and let m be the crossing point
length such that: D = {d1, d2, d3, . . . , dj} where dj is a building block or gene of the
decoder. Let w be the sliding window with w < m. Let us define the operator ⊗. Let
Σ = {0, 1, . . . , 9} ∪ {A,B, . . . , F} and let Σ+ be the set of all non-empty finite hexadeci-
mal sequences (over σ). Then, ⊗ : Σ+ × N+ → P(Σ+) where P is the power set.
The operator ⊗ is defined in the following manner: we use functional programming el-
ement to define our operator such as rec1,hd2,tl3 and @4. n-seq is a function taking two
arguments: a building block and the sliding window.
1rec: means recursive function
2hd: hd is a single list element and means head of list
3tl: means rest of the list
4@: means concatenation
46
⊗(dj, w) = let rec n-seq(dj, w) =
if m = 0 then <>
else hd(dj)@n− seq(tl(dj), w − 1)
in
let r = n− seq(dj, w))
in
{r} ∪ ⊗(tl(dj), w)
end
end
Consequently, ⊗(dj, w) = {w1, w2, w3, . . . , wj} with ∀wi ∈ ⊗(dj, w), we have wi =
w. Each wi is a sub-sequence from the building block dj . In order to illustrate this, we
consider the following example. Let assume that we have a decoder D of length 36 bytes
illustrated in Figure 4.3 .
Figure 4.3: 36-Byte Decoder Example
The crossing point length is such that m = 9. Thus, each 9 bytes, we have the building
blocks or genes. Figure 4.4 illustrates the generation of genes for each decoder:
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Figure 4.4: Decoder’s Genes
Thus D = {d1, d2, d3, d4} where di = Genei. We have a sliding window w = 5, (w <
m). By applying the operator ⊗ we get the following for ⊗(di, w) = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5}.
Table 4.1 shows the windows extraction for a gene:








w6 is discarded since w6 < w. The same applies for the other building blocks. Since
the defined fitness function is based on the schema theorem [29], it checks for correlation
between hexadecimal values as well as wildcard. The problem inherent to wildcards is the
fact that they should not be used extensively. Otherwise, each fragment of shellcode, when
compared with another, produces a positive correlation. Therefore, we check that at least
2
3
of the bytes correlate with each others. If it is the case, then the fitness value increases. For
instance: let wi = “A8DFFFFF” and wj = “A8E9FFFF”. The function compares
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each character with each other. If
2
3
or more of the characters are similar, then we have a
candidate pattern. Figure 4.5 illustrates the idea:
Figure 4.5: Correlation Process
Here we can see that 6 out 8 hexadecimal values correlate. Consequently the following





. If the correlation is total, then we
have a pattern with no mutation part. The correlation function checks for fixed bits as well
as mutated bits. Let define the operator ⊕ that performs that correlation:
• wi ⊕ wj = 1 , if the two segments correlate for 2
3
or more.
• wi ⊕ wj = 0 , if the two segments correlate for strictly less than 2
3
.
The operator is such that:
⊗ on (u, v) = let hu = hd(u)
hv = hd(v)
in
(hu = hv)@ on (tl(u), tl(v)
end
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Then correlation is such that:





The fitness value computation proceeds in the following manner. Let F (Dn) =
(wdi , wdj , w) be the fitness function value where: wdi , wdj are windows extracted from
respectively di, dj such that wdi = ⊗(d1, w) and wdj = ⊗(dj, w). w is the window size
and Dn a decoder or chromosome from the current population. Thus, the following is the




[∀w ∈ wdi ⊕
m∑
j=0
(∀w ∈ wdj)] with i 6= j
In other words, when dealing with a decoder, the following steps are followed in the corre-
lation process:
1. Generate the windows for each gene or building block.
2. For each gene and for each of its windows, apply the correlation function against
windows from other genes of the same decoder. The process continues until all
windows are checked.
3. At the end of the process, compute the fitness value for the decoder.




The selection phase is another core element of the engine. Since we base the fitness
function and more generally our GA engine on the schema theorem [29], the selection
process must be a proportionate one. In other words, the selection must pick up individuals
based on their relative fitness values. This make sense since such selection is recommended
when the final optimal solution is unknown .After applying the fitness function, we get the
correlation value for each member of the population at a certain epoch or round. In the
next step, we compute the probability of each member based on their fitness value. We
basically compute the total fitness for all members of the population and then compute their
individual probabilities. By doing so, we got their relative probability of being selected.
Let P be the population such that: P = {D1, D2, D3, . . . , Dn} with Dn being a decoder
or chromosome. After applying the fitness function, we get the individual fitness value for
each member. Let FIT be the individual fitness for each population members such that:
FIT = {F1, F2, F3, . . . , Fn} with Fn = F (Dn) (F being the fitness function defined in
the previous section). Let F (total) be the total fitness value for all population members.
F (total) =
∑








. This process respects the requirement of being proportionate. Having
the relative probabilities of selection for each population member, we need to proceed with
the selection. The selection goes by setting a threshold probability corresponding to the
probability of selecting an individual for the initial population. At epoch 0 or at t = 0, if
the total population is total init, then the threshold is thresh =
1
total init
. If the probability
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of an individual is greater or equal to the threshold, then the individual is selected for the
next round, otherwise he is dropped.
4.2.5 Replacement
The next step of the engine is the replacement process. There are two main types of re-
placements: generational updates and steady state updates. In our GA, generational update
is selected, which means that the old population is replaced entirely by the new one mak-
ing inter-generational reproduction impossible. The reason behind this choice is that we are
aiming to look for possible pattern extraction and see if they propagate from one generation
to another. Thus, it is more convenient to work on the building blocks that have passed the
selection test to see if they are again reproduced with blocks from another decoder.
4.2.6 Search and Termination
Our engine runs for 1000 rounds or epochs, once that number has been reached, the
last population is our candidate for signatures or patterns. Figure 4.6 summarizes the
functioning of the engine.
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Figure 4.6: Summary of the Engine
At this stage, we have described how the engine operates. However, we still do not
have the final signatures. In the next section, we discuss the extraction of signatures from
the pool of candidate solutions at the end of the engines rounds.
4.3 Signature/Pattern Extraction
Once the engine or GA ends, we have a set of decoders that are candidate solutions
for signatures or patterns for the analyzed polymorphic engine. The problem is that those
decoders or chromosomes are not the solution themselves. The building blocks constituting
the decoder contain pieces of shellcode that are patterns and others that are not. The main
reason behind that is the fact that a decoder can pass the selection by having some of
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its genes containing patterns and others that do not. Our aim is to traverse the whole
solution population and extract those patterns. Once the patterns are extracted, we need
to verify their validity. In other words, we need to check the pattern’s validity against the
initial population, which have not been altered by the reproduction process. Moreover, the
building blocks that we have do not contain wildcards. Accordingly, we need to include
them in the pattern extraction.
4.3.1 Patterns extraction
Pattern extraction is somehow similar to the correlation function (fitness function), but
with some differences. Let S be the final population or solution population such that
S = {S1, S2, S3, . . . , Sn}, each Si being a decoder or chromosome. The function extracts
patterns according to the following steps:
• Take each decoder and extract its building blocks knowing the window size.
• From each window generated from a single gene (by applying the operator ⊗), we
check if it is correlated against all other windows from other genes of the same de-
coder. The correlation algorithm is the same as the one from the fitness function.
• If a correlation exists,then the analyzed window is a candidate pattern.
• Generate a signature by replacing the uncorrelated parts by a wildcard.
• Insert the signature into the pool of patterns. If the signature already exists,discard
it, otherwise, insert it into the pool of patterns.
• Repeat the process until all the genes or building blocks are traversed.
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• Repeat the process until all the decoders are traversed (until the whole population is
checked against our extraction algorithm).
At the end of the process, we have the signatures. Let us illustrate the extraction mechanism
by taking the following example. Let D be a member of the last population with w = 6
and n = 8. From the crossing length n, we get the genes or building blocks presented in
Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Decoder’s Building Blocks
Now we need to apply the operator ⊗ against all the genes to generate their windows:
Table 4.2: Extracted Windows from Genes
Gene 1 Gene 2 Gene 3
w1 = D9FF64 w
′
1 = DEFF54 w
′′
1 = 86403C
w2 = 9FF645 w
′
2 = EFF54A
w3 = FF6455 w
′
3 = FF54AE
We just focus on w1 for the correlation. By checking w1 against all other windows, we
see that it correlates at
2
3
(or more) with w′1. Figure 4.8 illustrates the pattern extraction
process.
55
Figure 4.8: Pattern Extraction
Then, the same process is repeated with all the other windows from the same decoder
and the whole process is repeated until all the solution population is traversed. At the end
of the extraction, we get the signatures or patterns from the studied polymorphic engines.
4.3.2 Filtering Process
The importance of the filtering process resides in the fact that we need to check the
validity of the final signatures against the initial population who has not been altered by the
reproduction process. The filtering consists in taking each extracted patterns and checking
if it is present in more than 190 decoders out of 200 decoders selected from the initial
population. Before showing the experimental results, we need to explain first how the
engines work against changing-length decoders. The process that we have described so far
is exactly the same. The only difference with changing-length decoders is the fact that we
apply some algorithms prior to launching the engine, to generate a population of decoders
of the same length.
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4.4 Changing-Length Decoders
For polymorphic engines that generate changing length decoders, the process is very
similar to the signature detection described in section 4.3. However, some steps for gener-
ating fixed-length decoder are performed before the engine launching. In this section, we
describe how this transformation is done.
The problem with changing length decoders is that the described N -point crossover gener-
ates for each decoder a different number of building blocks or genes during the reproduction
process. As a consequence, we generate a reproduction sequence for a population that has
each of its members having a different number of genes or building blocks. One solution
would be to drop some genes along the reproduction process, but we might lose some ex-
isting patterns. In fact, dropping some genes is inevitable. Accordingly, we must find a
way to include as much genes as we can for each decoder. In order to explain why the fixed
N -point crossover does not work, let take the following example. Let D1 and D2 be two
decoders from an initial population with different lengths, illustrated in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Different Length
Let assume that the crossing-point length n = 10. The resulting building blocks or
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genes are shown in Figure 4.10 .
Figure 4.10: Various Length Decoders’ Building Blocks
The generation of a reproduction sequence becomes complicated when dealing with a
population that has a large number of individuals. Consequently, we need to drop some
genes from one of the decoder (probably the one with the biggest length) in order to couple
the two decoders. Even if we are able to overcome the population size problem, we still
need to drop a large number of genes in order to make the reproduction successful, which
is not a good idea. In fact, we must ensure that we can take the maximum number of
genes. Genetic algorithms have a special class of algorithms called Fast Messy Genetic
Algorithms (FmGA) [30] that deals with an initial population of individuals with various
lengths.
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4.5 Fast Messy Genetic Algorithms
Fast messy genetic algorithms are a class of genetic algorithms dealing with populations
of variable length. It is developed by Goldberg, Deb and Kargupta [30]. It contains three
main phases:
• The initialization phase: It deals with defining a sizing equation. More precisely, it
determines to which size or length we should extend the decoders in order to make
them all having the same length. The sizing equation must overcome what is called
the noise problem. In our case, the noise problem is generating logical length and
crossing point so that in the next phase, we are able to generate logical building
blocks.
• The Building Block Filtering (BBF) phase: It produces the genes or building blocks
so that they respect the sizing equation. It represents an important phase since it
generates logical building blocks in order to ensure that the pattern or signature ex-
traction produces logical output. Moreover, it ensures that we can take the maximum
number of genes that could be taken from each gene to make the deletion bits very
low for each decoder regardless of their lengths.
• The juxtaposition phase: In this phase, we take the building blocks produced from
the previous phase and combine them together to form the final decoders.
These are the main phases that are added to the genetic algorithm when dealing with a
population composed of chromosomes having different length.
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4.5.1 Initialization Phase
Our initialization phase consists of deriving the sizing equation. The process goes
through the following phases:
• Extract the minimum length decoder and the maximum length decoder.
• Check if the minimum length is a prime number:
– If true, then the minimum length is the crossing point
– Otherwise, the user is asked to input his crossing length. The crossing length
that is entered must be a multiple of the minimum length. In other words,
minimum length mod5 crossing length = 0.
• Generate the length to which all decoders extend to. This length is the next number
greater than the maximum length decoder such that it is a multiple of the crossing
point.
Executing this phase generates logical building blocks. To illustrate the idea, let take the
following example. Assume we have a decoder of length l and we want to extend the
decoder to a length that is not a multiple of the crossing point length. Thus, we have to
extend the decoder by a length α as illustrated in Figure 4.11.
5mod: modulo
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Figure 4.11: Extended Decoder
If 1 + α is not a multiple of the crossing point length, then we end up with non-logical
building blocks as presented in Figure 4.12 .
Figure 4.12: Non-Logical Building Blocks
We can see that Gene 3 does not make sense. The extended block is added to an original
portion of the decoder. Thus, in terms of bytes or shellcode, Gene 3 does not make any
sense since the bytes are mixed up with one other. Consequently, we must choose the
length of reference to which all decoders will extend to in a way to avoid such non-logical
building blocks. After identifying the maximum length in the pool of decoders, we choose
the length of reference to be the next greatest number after the maximum such that it is a
multiple of the crossing point. As an example, if we know the maximum length is 62 and
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the crossing point 6, then the length of reference becomes 66. At this stage, we can still
get non-logical building blocks. Our next phase definitely ensures the production of logical
building blocks for each decoder.
4.5.2 Building Block Filtering and Juxtaposition
From the sizing equation or initialization, we came out with two important parameters:
the crossing point length N and the length to which the decoders must be extended to
denoted by L. In order to ensure the selection of logical building blocks, this phase goes
through the following processes:
• Create, for each decoder, a pool of indexes that refers to each bit position of the
decoder, let call it POOL such that POOL = {p1, p2, p3, . . . , pn} where pn refers to a
bit position of the decoder.
• Initialize a variable called le to zero, then while(le×N < L):
– Pick a random index from POOL.
∗ If index+ cross length < length of the decoder, create a building block
of length N having the selected index as a starting point and add it to a
pool of genes called GENES. Delete the selected index from POOL and
increment le.
∗ Otherwise, select another index.
– Repeat the process until le×N > L (until a decoder of size L is obtained).
• Repeat the process until we traverse the whole population.
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At the end, we obtain a decoder that is not be affected by the crossing-point problem that
we have described previously. Moreover, since for each decoder we are trying to reach a
length greater than the maximum length decoder, the rate of bit deletion is very low. Let
us illustrate the process by the following example. We assume we have a population of
decoders such that the maximum length decoder is 25 and the minimum length decoder is
16. Our crossing point is N = 8. Thus, L = 32, which represents the next greater number
than 25 such that it is multiple of N . Let us see how the process goes through a decoder
D1 of length 17 as illustrated in Figure 4.13 .
Figure 4.13: Initial Decoder
In this case, we have: POOL = {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 16}. We proceed with the Building Block
Filtering (BBF), le = 0 and loop until le × N > L. The following Table 4.3 details the
genes extraction:
Table 4.3: Genes Extraction
Index Selected Verification Gene Extracted Genes’ Pool
Index 3 3 +N = 11 < 17 B1 = F5490FFF B1
Index 11 11 +N = 19 > 17 None B1
Index 7 7 +N = 15 < 17 B2 = 0FFFFA88 B1, B2
Index 4 4 +N = 12 < 17 B3 = 5490FFFF B1, B2, B3
Index 1 1 +N = 9 < 17 B4 = 9FF5490F B1, B2, B3, B4
At the end, we end up with the following decoder shown by Figure 4.14 .
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Figure 4.14: Final Decoder
We can see that the decoder contains logical building blocks and are not be affected by
the N -point crossing over. The main reason behind this is the fact that the crossing point
is always in a bit position that generates logical building blocks (since the building blocks
are multiple of the crossing point length).
The juxtaposition phase is embedded within the BBF phase since it only consists of
appending the genes between them to form a new decoder.
4.5.3 Filtering
The filtering takes place before the BBF process. We describe first the BBF phase be-
cause of its importance even though the filtering happens before. In this respect, filtering
comes when the length of a decoder is not long enough to reach the length L derived from
the sizing equation. Thus such decoders are eliminated from the initial population. This
operation of elimination constitutes the filtering part of the FMGA [30].
64
4.5.4 Engine
At the end of the FMGA process [30], we end up with a population of decoders having
the same length, the process of pattern and signature extraction remains the same. Having
decoders of the same length, the process described in previous sections for pattern extrac-
tion takes place.
4.6 Results
We test the engine against the three polymorphic engines; one engine generating fixed
length decoders and the two others generating changing-length decoders. Shikata Ga Nai is
our choice for the fixed length decoder engine , ADMmutate and Tapion are our choice for
changing-length decoders. For the Shikata Ga Nai engine, we got the following patterns at
the end of the engine:












For Tapion engine, we get the following patterns at the end of the engine:
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For ADMmutate, we get the following results:



















































We can see from these results that we need another filtering for the patterns. As an exam-
ple, let take the results from Shikata Ga Nai. We get: “d97424”, “7424f4” and “97424f”.
In fact, those patterns correspond to one long signature which is : “d97424f4”. We see that
the signatures need to be merged. Another problem that we observe for the signatures is
the similarities between them. Let us take the case of ADMmutate, we can see the follow-
ing patterns: “964096”, “964X9X” and “9X4X96”. In fact, they somehow correspond to
the same signature. Consequently, they must be reduced to one signature corresponding
to “964096”. At the end, we need to implement an automated mechanism in order to deal
with such similarities and then filter the patterns. Fortunaltely, the Levensthein distance
[31] can help us in the matter as explained hereafter.
4.7 Filtering
The filtering process goes through three main phases, but before explaining them in de-
tail, we dedicate the next section for introducing briefly the concept of Levensthein distance
[31]
4.7.1 Levensthein Distance
The Levensthein distance is used to compute the amount of difference between two
strings. It consists of giving the minimum number of operations needed to transform one
string to another. The operations consist of insertion, deletion and substitution of a sin-
gle character.The concept was developed by Vladimir Levensthein and it is often used to
measure or determine how similar are two strings.
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4.7.2 Filtering Process
The filtering process goes through three main phases. The phases are the following:
• Locate patterns having the less number of wildcard characters and compute the lev-
ensthein distance against all other patterns:
– If the distance is less or equal to 2 then probably the two strings are very similar
(in the form “964096” and “964X9X”). The signature that is checked against is
deleted.
– Otherwise, it means that the two patterns are completely different and thus kept.
• Take the input from the last operation and merge signatures if they can be merged.
• Take the input from the merging and take each single signature and compare it with
all the others. We check the number of common bits at the same position without
taking into consideration the wildcard characters X.
– If the number is greater or equal than
2
3
of the string, then take the one with less
wildcards and drop the other.
• Take the input from the three level of filtering and repeat again the three filtering
phases. If from one round to another, the number of signatures remains the same
then the process is stopped.
After the engine generated the patterns (see previous Section 4.6), we apply to the output
the filtering process in order to extract the final Shape Signatures. We get the following
signatures at the end presented in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7: Final Shape Signatures for Polymorphic Engines







The results we got previously were extracted from a single set of 1000 decoders. In
order to validate the results, we need to test the signatures against the sets that we have
generated. As a reminder, we have generated 3 new sets of each 1000 decoders, 3 new
sets of each 5000 decoders and 3 new sets of each 10000 decoders for each polymorphic
engine. The validation consists of analyzing each decoders from each set and check if the
shape signatures that we have extracted exist. We then provide the rate of detection for each
set. At the end, we average the various rates from each set to give the final rate of detection
for each signature. The detection rates for the extracted signature applied on Shikata Ga
Nai polymorphic engine and the corresponding average rates are presented in Table 4.8
and Table 4.9 respectively.
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Table 4.8: Detection for Shikata Ga Nai Signatures
Sets Signatures Rate of Detection
1000 1 XXd97424f4XX 100 %
XXb116XX 0 %
1000 2 XXd97424f4XX 100 %
XXb116XX 0 %
1000 3 XXd97424f4XX 100 %
XXb116XX 0 %
5000 1 XXd97424f4XX 100 %
XXb116XX 0 %
5000 2 XXd97424f4XX 100 %
XXb116XX 0 %
5000 3 XXd97424f4XX 100 %
XXb116XX 0 %
10000 1 XXd97424f4XX 100 %
XXb116XX 0 %
10000 2 XXd97424f4XX 100 %
XXb116XX 0 %
10000 3 XXd97424f4XX 100 %
XXb116XX 0 %
Table 4.9: Average Detection for Shikata Ga Nai Signatures
Signatures Rate of Detection
XXd97424f4XX 100 %
XXb116XX 0 %
The detection rates for the extracted signatures applied on ADMmutate polymorphic
engine and the corresponding averages rates are presented in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11
respectively.
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Table 4.10: Detection for ADMmutate Signatures
Sets Signatures Rate of Detection








































10000 3 XX81c3XX 99.1 %
XX83c601XX 78.8 %
XX964096XX 79 %
Continued on next page
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Table 4.10 – continued from previous page
Sets Signatures Rate of Detection
Xffffff 98.43 %
e8XXfff 98.43 %
Table 4.11: Average Detection for ADMmutate Signatures






The detection rates for the extracted signatures applied on Tapion polymorphic engine
and the corresponding average rates are presented in Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 respec-
tively.
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Table 4.12: Detection for Tapion Signatures
Sets Signatures Rate of Detection
1000 1 XXX9bdbe3d 98.7 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 76 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 %
1000 2 XXX9bdbe3d 98.6 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 78 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 %
1000 3 XXX9bdbe3d 98.5 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 74.7 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 %
5000 1 XXX9bdbe3d 98.54 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 76.4 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 %
5000 2 XXX9bdbe3d 98.56 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 76.36 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 %
5000 3 XXX9bdbe3d 98.4 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 77.24 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 %
10000 1 XXX9bdbe3d 98.63 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 76.79 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 %
10000 2 XXX9bdbe3d 98.47 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 76.31 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 %
10000 3 XXX9bdbe3d 98.59 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 75.47 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 %
Table 4.13: Average Detection for Tapion Signatures






The average rates of detection we get against the three polymorphic engine are very
promising. Even when tested against all the sets, the signatures produced are valid. The
only exception is the signature “XXb116XX”, which must be dropped, generated for
Shikata Ga Nai which has a 0% rate of detection. But, overall the results prove that the
extracted shape signature holds since we get high average rates of detection for all engines
with 76.36% being the lowest rate. This confirms that the GA engine is very effective
and that our concept of Shape Signature holds. We are able to locate invariant parts of
polymorphic shellcode as well as mutated parts and incorporate them into a signature.
4.10 Conclusion
We can conclude by saying that genetic algorithms are very efficient in detecting patterns
of polymorphic engines. The Schema Theorem [29] holds since we are able to effectively
extract reliable signatures. Our concept of shape signature suits polymorphic engines. The
ability to detect constant parts as well as mutated part is able to effectively cope with
the polymorphic nature of such engines. Our assumption that shape signatures are able
to produce above average schemata is verified . The results show that, as opposed with
traditional models of signatures, which require a huge number of sequences to cope with
polymorphism according to Song et al. [3] (in the order of O(28n) with n being the length
of the decoder), our model generates a very limited number of signatures. The average
detection resulting from the experiments shows that the shape signatures produces very
interessting rates. The rest of the thesis is dedicated to modeling polymorphic engines. We
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show that the decoders generated from those engines do not look as random as they claim to
be. In fact, we can consistently predict the location of the shape signature as well as areas
of high mutation allowing us to map their decoders. Moreover, those engines possesse
unique compositions, in terms of bytes, that can help us characterize them uniquely.
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Chapter 5
Analysis of Shape Signature Positions
In this Chapter, we explain how decoders generated from polymorphic engines can be
mapped. By mapping, we mean that we can consistently predict the areas of high mutation
as well as the areas containing the shape signatures. Our genetic algorithm engine for
extracting shape signatures shows some promising results. Usually, highly polymorphic
engines make those signatures appear at different bit positions using sliding techniques.
Moreover, they also have the ability to change their length, making the change of positions
even more effective. However, the constraint of consistency makes the sliding or changing
of bit positions not as random as it might appear. In other words, the shape signatures
extracted cannot appear just at any bit positions otherwise the consistency of the decoder is
compromised. In other words, even when changing its length, an engine must respect the
structure of assembly language. The ability of some engines to change their length might
make those signatures appear at very different positions. However, even when the length
of the decoder changes, it must appear at positions that do not break the consistency of the
decoder with respect to the length of the decoder. By analyzing each time the bit positions
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relatively to the length of decoder, we might be able to model those polymorphic engines.
In fact, we believe that the signatures do not cover a large space of the decoder (in terms of
bit positions) as it is claimed rather, they have a small area in which they shift positions.
5.1 Approach
Basically, we can differentiate two types of polymorphic engines: fixed-length engines
e.g. Shikata Ga Nai and changing-length engines e.g. ADMmutate. The challenge is to
define a model for analyzing the starting and ending positions for the extracted signatures
for both models. In order to do this, we define what we call relative positions. Let us
assume we have a decoder of length L. The signature starts at a bit position s and ends at a
bit position e. Then, the relative start is:
s
L
× 100 and the relative end is e
L
× 100. In order
to analyze the shape signature positions, we go through the following steps:
• For each decoder for a specific engine, we record the relative start and the relative
end for each shape signature found.
• We compute the mean relative start and the mean relative end for each signature.
• Then, we compute the standard deviation for the recorded relative starts and relative
ends to quantify the gap between the measurements.
• Finally, we average the results for each measurements to get the final mean relative
start, mean relative end, standard deviation for the relative starts and relative ends.
The process is applied for each set of population that is generated for each single polymor-
phic engine. The average results computed in the last steps allow computing the final mean
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relative start, the final mean relative end, the final standard deviation for relative starting
positions and the final standard deviation for relative ending positions.
5.2 Results
In this section, we present the results for the three polymorphic engines. The following
notations are used in the tables summarizing the obtained results:
• MRS: Mean Relative Start.
• MRE: Mean Relative End.
• STD DEV MRS: Standard Deviation for Mean Relative Start.
• STD DEV MRS: Standard Deviation for Mean Relative End.
The shape signature position analysis for the extracted signatures applied on Shikata Ga
Nai polymorphic engine and the corresponding average shape signature position analysis
are presented in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 respectively.
Table 5.1: Shape Signature Position Analysis for Shikata Ga Nai
Sets Signatures MRS MRE STD DEV MRS STD DEV MRE
1000 1 XXd97424f4XX 27.825 48.196 12.247 12.247
1000 2 XXd97424f4XX 27.492 47.862 12.238 12.238
1000 3 XXd97424f4XX 27.177 47.548 12.119 12.119
5000 1 XXd97424f4XX 27.408 47.779 12.158 12.158
5000 2 XXd97424f4XX 27.666 48.037 12.112 12.112
5000 3 XXd97424f4XX 27.914 48.284 11.997 11.997
10000 1 XXd97424f4XX 28.063 48.434 11.915 11.915
10000 2 XXd97424f4XX 27.843 48.213 11.964 11.964
10000 3 XXd97424f4XX 27.728 48.098 12.104 12.104
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Table 5.2: Average Shape Signature Position Analysis for Shikata Ga Nai
Signatures MRS MRE STD DEV MRS STD DEV MRE
XXd97424f4XX 27.679 48.05 12.094 12.094
The shape signature position analysis for the extracted signatures applied on Tapion
polymorphic engine and the corresponding average shape signature position analysis are
presented in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 respectively.
80
Table 5.3: Shape Signature Position Analysis for Tapion
Sets Signatures MRS MRE STD DEV MRS STD DEV MRE
1000 1 f8fXXfXffff 97.836 98.92 0.61 0.507
XfXd9fXd9fX 45.466 46.537 28.866 28.889
XXX9bdbe3d 1.5 2.482 0.845 0.911
1000 2 f8fXXfXffff 97.806 98.909 0.622 0.522
XfXd9fXd9fX 43.611 44.707 28.832 28.858
XXX9bdbe3d 1.508 2.505 0.83 0.897
1000 3 f8fXXfXffff 97.755 98.816 0.651 0.541
XfXd9fXd9fX 46.945 48.039 28.622 28.638
XXX9bdbe3d 1.546 2.548 0.938 1.014
5000 1 f8fXXfXffff 97.818 98.915 0.626 0.533
XfXd9fXd9fX 45.036 46.123 28.685 28.701
XXX9bdbe3d 1.517 2.51 0.916 0.982
5000 2 f8fXXfXffff 97.793 98.892 0.633 0.534
XfXd9fXd9fX 44.439 45.531 28.884 28.901
XXX9bdbe3d 1.507 2.502 0.909 0.971
5000 3 f8fXXfXffff 97.811 98.911 0.623 0.528
XfXd9fXd9fX 45.041 46.13 29.001 29.022
XXX9bdbe3d 1.528 2.523 0.882 0.95
10000 1 f8fXXfXffff 97.812 98.911 0.625 0.534
XfXd9fXd9fX 44.694 45.783 29.133 29.15
XXX9bdbe3d 1.533 2.526 0.878 0.945
10000 2 f8fXXfXffff 97.815 98.91 0.624 0.528
XfXd9fXd9fX 45.345 46.433 29.231 29.246
XXX9bdbe3d 1.518 2.51 0.879 0.944
10000 3 f8fXXfXffff 97.798 98.898 0.625 0.533
XfXd9fXd9fX 45.083 46.173 28.887 28.905
XXX9bdbe3d 1.537 2.533 0.887 0.952
Table 5.4: Average Shape Signature Position Analysis for Tapion
Signatures MRS MRE STD DEV MRS STD DEV MRE
f8fXXfXffff 97.805 98.902 0.626 0.526
XfXd9fXd9fX 45.073 46.162 28.904 28.923
XXX9bdbe3d 1.521 2.515 0.885 0.951
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The shape signature position analysis for the extracted signatures applied on ADMmu-
tate polymorphic engine and the corresponding average shape signature position analysis
are presented in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 respectively.
Table 5.5: Shape Signature Position Analysis for ADMmutate




1000 1 XX81c3XX 46.03 50.116 7.277 7.353
XX83c601XX 62.158 67.377 9.172 9.175
XX964996XX 62.285 67.503 9.047 9.03
Xffffff 96.47 99.957 0.499 0.154
e8XXfff 94.769 98.256 0.695 0.232
1000 2 XX81c3XX 46.146 50.284 7.778 7.946
XX83c601XX 61.723 66.981 9.028 9.026
XX964996XX 62.475 67.706 8.408 8.405
Xffffff 96.443 99.96 0.495 0.151
e8XXfff 94.725 98.242 0.686 0.228
1000 3 XX81c3XX 46.086 50.198 7.24 7.298
XX83c601XX 62.194 67.437 8.617 8.581
XX964996XX 62.45 67.677 8.969 8.963
Xffffff 96.447 99.953 0.502 0.16
e8XXfff 94.74 98.246 0.697 0.232
5000 1 XX81c3XX 46.379 50.475 7.451 7.613
XX83c601XX 62.374 67.573 8.768 8.768
XX964996XX 62.372 67.564 8.688 8.695
Xffffff 96.485 99.966 0.481 0.134
e8XXfff 94.777 98.259 0.692 0.231
5000 2 XX81c3XX 46.271 50.385 7.678 7.862
XX83c601XX 62.226 67.434 8.749 8.746
XX964996XX 62.304 67.527 8.797 8.799
Xffffff 96.47 99.965 0.489 0.14
e8XXfff 94.758 98.253 0.695 0.232
5000 3 XX81c3XX 46.279 50.395 7.872 8.062
XX83c601XX 62.522 67.747 8.798 8.798
XX964996XX 62.395 67.604 8.81 8.808
Xffffff 96.472 99.966 0.485 0.137
Continued on next page
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Table 5.5 – continued from previous page




e8XXfff 94.759 98.253 0.691 0.23
10000 1 XX81c3XX 46.267 50.382 7.819 8.001
XX83c601XX 62.335 67.554 8.887 8.883
XX964996XX 62.259 67.483 8.807 8.818
Xffffff 96.467 99.962 0.499 0.145
e8XXfff 94.757 98.252 0.705 0.235
10000 2 XX81c3XX 46.057 50.157 7.31 7.402
XX83c601XX 62.271 67.498 8.83 8.834
XX964996XX 62.359 67.583 8.869 8.875
Xffffff 96.468 99.964 0.492 0.14
e8XXfff 94.756 98.252 0.704 0.235
10000 3 XX81c3XX 46.301 50.41 7.421 7.543
XX83c601XX 62.563 67.788 8.79 8.789
XX964996XX 62.509 67.736 8.774 8.783
Xffffff 96.465 99.963 0.489 0.143
e8XXfff 94.752 98.251 0.695 0.232
Table 5.6: Average Shape Signature Position Analysis for ADMmutate
Signatures MRS MRE STD DEV MRS STD DEV MRE
XX81c3XX 46.2 50.311 7.54 7.675
XX83c601XX 62.263 67.487 8.849 8.844
XX964996XX 62.378 67.598 8.796 8.797
Xffffff 96.465 99.962 0.492 0.145
e8XXfff 94.754 98.251 0.695 0.232
5.3 Interpretation
As we can see for the three engines, the relative positions for both start and end for a
signature are very similar for each set of population. The same applies for their standard
deviations. We can deduce that the area where the signatures appear in average seems to
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be the same for each set of population. The standard deviation shows us the differences in
terms of positions for each signature. In other words, it shows us the area of shift for each
shape signature. Consequently, we can see that, in reality, the shape signatures do not cover
the whole dimensions of a decoder (in terms of bits positions). They rather cover a small
area in which they shift positions. The changing length ability of some engines might seem
to make those engine covering a large area of the decoders. However, if we look at the
relative positions with respect to the decoder length, we see that it is not the case. Based
on those results, we can confirm our assumption that the constraint of consistency of the
decoder, is an important factor that allows to effectively map the structure of a polymorphic
decoder. Based on this, we can map the decoders for each of the polymorphic engines by
locating :
• The shape signatures
• Their area of shift
• The zone of high mutations of the decoder
• The potential zone of mutations
The following Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 summarize the analysis:
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Figure 5.1: ADM Mapping
Figure 5.2: Tapion Mapping
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Figure 5.3: Shikata Ga Nai Mapping
5.4 Verification
In this section, we verify whether our conlusions in terms of shape signatures bit posi-
tions hold or not. For that purpose, we try to identify if there is a correlation between the
detection rate of each signature for each polymorphic engine and the detection rate of the
same signatures by taking into account their position in the decoder. We aim at verifying
their actual location based on the previous results, especially the average shape signature
position analysis value. If the correlation between the two rates is the same, then we can
safely confirm that our modeling holds and that the polymorphic engines effectively com-
ply with the consistency constraint, which restrain their shape signatures to shift with only
a small extent within the decoder’s dimension. We test each polymorphic engine for all the
sets and then average the results at the end.
The detection for the extracted signatures with and without position verification applied on
Shikata Ga Nai polymorphic engine is presented in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7: Detection for Shikata Ga Nai Signatures without and with Position Verification
Sets Signatures Detection Detection with Position Verification
1000 1 XXd97424f4XX 100 % 100 %
1000 2 XXd97424f4XX 100 % 100 %
1000 3 XXd97424f4XX 100 % 100 %
5000 1 XXd97424f4XX 100 % 100 %
5000 2 XXd97424f4XX 100 % 100 %
5000 3 XXd97424f4XX 100 % 100 %
10000 1 XXd97424f4XX 100 % 100 %
10000 2 XXd97424f4XX 100 % 100 %
10000 3 XXd97424f4XX 100 % 100 %
The detection for the extracted signatures with and without position verification applied
on Tapion polymorphic engine is presented in Table 5.8.
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Table 5.8: Detection for Tapion Signatures without and with Position Verification
Sets Signatures Detection Detection with Position Verification
1000 1 XXX9bdbe3d 98.7 % 98.7 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 76 % 76 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 % 100 %
1000 2 XXX9bdbe3d 98.6 % 98.6 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 78 % 78 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 % 100 %
1000 3 XXX9bdbe3d 98.5 % 98.5 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 74.7 % 74.7 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 % 100 %
5000 1 XXX9bdbe3d 98.54 % 98.54 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 76.4 % 76.4 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 % 100 %
5000 2 XXX9bdbe3d 98.56 % 98.56 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 76.36 % 76.36 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 % 100 %
5000 3 XXX9bdbe3d 98.4 % 98.4 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 77.24 % 77.24 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 % 100 %
10000 1 XXX9bdbe3d 98.63 % 98.63 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 76.79 % 76.79 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 % 100 %
10000 2 XXX9bdbe3d 98.47 % 98.47 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 76.31 % 76.31 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 % 100 %
10000 3 XXX9bdbe3d 98.59 % 98.59 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 75.47 % 75.47 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 % 100 %
The detection for the extracted signatures with and without position verification applied
on ADMmutate polymorphic engine is presented in Table 5.9.
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Table 5.9: Detection for ADMmutate Signatures without and with
Position Verification
Sets Signatures Detection Detection with Position Verification
1000 1 XX81c3XX 99.4 % 99.4 %
XX83c601XX 80.2 % 80.2 %
XX964096XX 80.2 % 80.2 %
Xffffff 98.88 % 98.88 %
e8XXfff 98.88 % 98.88 %
1000 2 XX81c3XX 98.7 % 98.7 %
XX83c601XX 78.7 % 78.7 %
XX964096XX 80 % 80 %
Xffffff 98 % 98 %
e8XXfff 98 % 98 %
1000 3 XX81c3XX 99.5 % 99.5 %
XX83c601XX 78.25 % 78.25 %
XX964096XX 77.4 % 77.4 %
Xffffff 99 % 99 %
e8XXfff 99 % 99 %
5000 1 XX81c3XX 99.2 % 99.2 %
XX83c601XX 78.9 % 78.9 %
XX964096XX 79.5 % 79.5 %
Xffffff 98.5 % 98.5 %
e8XXfff 98.5 % 98.5 %
5000 2 XX81c3XX 99 % 99 %
XX83c601XX 79.3 % 79.3 %
XX964096XX 78.25 % 78.25 %
Xffffff 98 % 98 %
e8XXfff 98 % 98 %
5000 3 XX81c3XX 99.16 % 99.16 %
XX83c601XX 79 % 79 %
XX964096XX 79 % 79 %
Xffffff 98.14 % 98.14 %
e8XXfff 98.14 % 98.14 %
10000 1 XX81c3XX 99.16 % 99.16 %
XX83c601XX 78.6 % 78.6 %
XX964096XX 79 % 79 %
Xffffff 98.24 % 98.24 %
e8XXfff 98.24 % 98.24 %
10000 2 XX81c3XX 99 % 99 %
XX83c601XX 78.54 % 78.54 %
XX964096XX 79.7 % 79.7 %
Xffffff 98.46 % 98.46 %
e8XXfff 98.46 % 98.46 %
10000 3 XX81c3XX 99.1 % 99.1 %
XX83c601XX 78.8 % 78.8 %
Continued on next page
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Table 5.9 – continued from previous page
Sets Signatures Detection Detection with Position Verification
XX964096XX 79 % 79 %
Xffffff 98.43 % 98.43 %
e8XXfff 98.43 % 98.43 %
The average detection for the three polymorphic engines’ shape signatures is summa-
rized in the following Table 5.10:
Table 5.10: Average Detection for Engines without and with Position Verification
Engine Signatures Detection Detection with Position Verification
Shikata Ga Nai XXd97424f4XX 100 % 100 %
Tapion XXX9bdbe3d 98.55 % 98.55 %
XfXd9fXd9fX 76.36 % 76.36 %
f8fXXfXffff 100 % 100 %
ADMmutate XX81c3XX 99.13 % 99.13 %
XX83c601XX 79 % 79 %
XX964096XX 79.11 % 79.11 %
Xffffff 98.4 % 98.4 %
e8XXfff 98.4 % 98.4 %
5.5 Conclusion
According to the results, there is a strong correlation between the rate of signature detection
and the rate of the same signatures detection by taking into consideration their expected
location. This confirms that the mapping of polymorphic engines decoders holds. More
generally, it confirms the previous assumption that polymorphic engines’ shape signatures,
do not explore the whole decoder’s dimensions (in terms of bit positions) but rather shift in
a defined area of the decoder. The main reason behind this is the constraint of consistency
they must obey. In other words, the fact that the decoder obey to some semantics reduces
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the ability of shifting the bits in a random fashion. In the next chapter, we try to characterize
even more polymorphic decoders by looking at their byte composition. The aim is to find
out if we can differentiate those polymorphic decoders, from their compositions, from any




In this Chapter, we try to improve the modeling of polymorphic engines by exploring their
byte compositions. In the previous Chapter, we have successfully shown that it is possible
to consistently predict shape signature locations and areas of high mutations making poly-
morphic shellcode decoder subject to consistency constraints. In this chapter, we explore
the byte composition of the studied polymorphic engines. Additionally, we show that it is
possible to characterize polymorphic shellcode from its byte composition.
6.1 Byte Spectrum Analysis
Before starting analyzing the decoder composition, we need to conduct some experi-
ments in order to check the nature of bytes that are used in the three polymorphic engines’
decoders. From the analysis, we can then start to develop a mechanism in order to analyze
the composition of those engines. The experiment consists of recording, for each engine,
the number of occurrences for each byte from {0× 00, . . . , 0× FF}. We define, for each
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studied polymorphic engine, three samples: a population number of 1000 decoders, a pop-
ulation number of 5000 decoders and a population number of 10000 decoders. For each
sample, we generate three different sets resulting in total of 9 samples. Finally, we conduct
the experiments on each sample and record the results.
6.2 Results
Hereafter, we examine the results of byte spectrum analysis that we obtain for each engine.
The x-axis refers to the byte spectrum {0 × 00, . . . , 0 × FF} while the y-axis examines
the number of occurences of those bytes. The sets are named in the following manner:
“Set A B” where A refers to the population number and B to the set label (1st, 2nd, . . .) .
The byte occurences of each set for the Shikata Ga Nai byte spectrum are illustrated in the
charts from Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.9.
Figure 6.1: Shikata Byte Spectrum for Set 1000 1
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Figure 6.2: Shikata Byte Spectrum for Set 1000 2
Figure 6.3: Shikata Byte Spectrum for Set 1000 3
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Figure 6.4: Shikata Byte Spectrum for Set 5000 1
Figure 6.5: Shikata Byte Spectrum for Set 5000 2
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Figure 6.6: Shikata Byte Spectrum for Set 5000 3
Figure 6.7: Shikata Byte Spectrum for Set 10000 1
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Figure 6.8: Shikata Byte Spectrum for Set 10000 2
Figure 6.9: Shikata Byte Spectrum for Set 10000 3
The spectrums illustrated in Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.9 are very similar in their shapes,
which shows that there is a pattern in terms of byte occurrences for Shikata Ga Nai. As
expected, the whole byte spectrum is explored (with the exception of the null byte). Let us
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consider the most repeated bytes as the bytes that are greater or equal than the population
number in terms of number of occurrences. One can notice that the same most repeated
bytes are present across the various sets. Let see in the following whether the observations
made for the Shikata Ga Nai are still valid for ADMmutate. The byte occurence of each set
for the ADMmutate polymorphic engine are illustrated from Figure 6.10 to Figure 6.18 .
Figure 6.10: ADMmutate Byte Spectrum for Set 1000 1
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Figure 6.11: ADMmutate Byte Spectrum for Set 1000 2
Figure 6.12: ADMmutate Byte Spectrum for Set 1000 3
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Figure 6.13: ADMmutate Byte Spectrum for Set 5000 1
Figure 6.14: ADMmutate Byte Spectrum for Set 5000 2
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Figure 6.15: ADMmutate Byte Spectrum for Set 5000 3
Figure 6.16: ADMmutate Byte Spectrum for Set 10000 1
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Figure 6.17: ADMmutate Byte Spectrum for Set 10000 2
Figure 6.18: ADMmutate Byte Spectrum for Set 10000 3
Again, the same observations for Shikata Ga Nai are also verified for ADMmutate. We
have an identical shape for all sets’ byte spectrums. The most repeated bytes are constant
across the various sets. As for the spectrums for Tapion, the byte occurence of each set are
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illustrated from Figure 6.19 to Figure 6.27 .
Figure 6.19: Tapion Byte Spectrum for Set 1000 1
Figure 6.20: Tapion Byte Spectrum for Set 1000 2
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Figure 6.21: Tapion Byte Spectrum for Set 1000 3
Figure 6.22: Tapion Byte Spectrum for Set 5000 1
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Figure 6.23: Tapion Byte Spectrum for Set 5000 2
Figure 6.24: Tapion Byte Spectrum for Set 5000 3
105
Figure 6.25: Tapion Byte Spectrum for Set 10000 1
Figure 6.26: Tapion Byte Spectrum for Set 10000 2
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Figure 6.27: Tapion Byte Spectrum for Set 10000 3
We can observe that Tapion does not deviate from the previous observations. Given
these results, we can conclude that polymorphic engines, indeed, explore the whole byte
spectrum. However, they exhibit a similar pattern in terms of byte occurrences. Moreover,
the same most repeated bytes are present across sets of different population size. Thus,
we can use this valuable information as an important parameter in the analysis of byte
composition.
6.3 Interpretation
While observing the number of occurrences of bytes for each polymorphic engine, one
can notice that the most repeated bytes are constant across the various sets. Some of them
are found in their respective shape signatures, however, others are not. The most important
issue here is to investigate what this valuable information can be useful for and how it can
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help in understanding or modeling polymorphic engines. So far, we have studied the shape
signatures and their bit position analysis. Now, we need another way to study polymorphic
engines in order to integrate byte occurrences. The most important observation that one
can make about those repeated bytes for each engine is that most of them are not NOP
instructions (being single argument or multi argument). Based on that, it seems that an
analysis of those engines in terms of composition could reveal interesting information about
polymorphic engines.
6.4 Analysis
Let us consider a decoder as a zone of high polymorphism, we can define three main ele-




By Nop Area, we mean the nop elements being single or multi byte arguments. A sin-
gle byte argument NOP consists of a single x86 no-operation instruction whereas a multi
byte argument NOP is a no-operation instruction that can take arguments. In this case,
the Nop Area includes the no-operation instruction plus its argument. The arguments do
not necessarily belong to the category of x86 no-operation instructions . As an example,
the following sequence 0× 3541424344 is considered a Nop Area as well as the single
instruction 0× 41. The Byte Spectrum consists of the bytes that characterize the polymor-
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phic engines. The process of extracting those bytes is detailled in section 6.5. Finally, by
Other Bytes we mean the bytes that are neither part of Nop Area nor the Byte Spectrum.
Based on these elements, some logical assumptions that characterize a decoder in terms of
composition have to be defined.
The first assumption to be made is that a decoder should have in excess (in terms of byte
occurences) either the Nop Area or the Byte Spectrum and never the Other Bytes. Another
important assumption is that the Byte Spectrum must not be neither very low nor null. The
threshold for what we consider low is addressed in Sections 6.8 and 6.9 .The Nop Area, in
terms of composition, should be recognizable, from a regular NOP section that might pre-
ceed the decoder. In other words, the decoder must not be composed of NOPs exclusively.
The aim of this composition analysis is to check whether we can differentiate the decoders,
in their compositions, from a regular NOP section and from any random sequence of bytes.
In summary, our assumptions are as follows:
1. Nops Area or Byte Spectrum should be the most present elements in terms of compo-
sition.
2. Byte Spectrum must not be null.
3. Byte Spectrum should have an acceptable amount (the threshold issue is addressed in
sections 6.8 and 6.9).
4. Nop Area should be recognizable from a regular NOP section.
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6.5 Byte Spectrum Extraction
The byte spectrum elements correspond to the most repeated bytes for a polymorphic
decoder. In terms of occurences, their number is greater or equal than the population size.
Byte spectrum figures have shown that those bytes remain the same across sets of popu-
lation for each polymorphic engines. Consequently, analyzing one spectrum for a specific
set is enough. This statement is reinforced by the fact that the shapes of byte occurrences
are the same for all engines. For Shikate Ga Nai and ADMmutate, we see that the num-
ber of bytes exceeding the population size is relatively small compared to other bytes.
Moreover, among these same most repeated bytes, the differences in terms of occurrences
between bytes are relatively small. However, the case of Tapion is interesting since we can
make for it the opposite claim; the number of most repeated bytes is large and the gaps
between the number of bytes execeeding the population size and the other bytes are wide.
This is mainly due to the ability of Tapion to generate a lot of padding. However, some
bytes clearly distinguish themselves from others by having a number of occurences that
is relatively important. By analyzing Tapion spectrum, presented in Figure 6.28, we can
distinguish many levels that exceed the population number.
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Figure 6.28: Tapion Byte Spectrum
The red line in Figure 6.28 shows the population size and the black line the distin-
guishable bytes in terms of occurrences.The aim is to extract those meaningful most re-
peated bytes. This problem is not encountered for Shikata Ga Nai and ADMmutate, which
spectrums are illustrated in Figure 6.29 and Figure 6.30 respectively.
Figure 6.29: Shikata Ga Nai Byte Spectrum
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Figure 6.30: ADMmutate Byte Spectrum
Therein, the number of bytes exceeding the population size (above the red line) is small
and the differences in terms of byte occurrences between those most repeated bytes are very
small. The following algorithm deals with that by extracting the most meaningful bytes:
1. Select the bytes exceeding the population size (the population size corresponds to the
number of decoders).
2. Select, among those bytes, the minimum occurrence (denoted by Min) and the max-







< 0.2 then select only bytes that have their occurrence being at least
10% of Max.
• Otherwise take all the bytes exceeding the population size.
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The threshold of 0.2 allows us to recognize engines that are able to generate a lot of
padding. If an engine is having the ratio
Min
Max
< 0.2, then we know that the engine is
generating a lot of padding. Thus we need to apply a filter that permits the extraction of the
most meaningful bytes. This is done by selecting bytes with an occurence of at least 10%
of Max. From the tests conducted, the values chosen seem to be adequate for selecting the
most meaningful bytes. By doing so, we are able to extract the bytes for each polymor-
phic engines’ decoders shown in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 for respectively Shikata Ga Nai,
ADMmutate and Tapion.








































6.6 Byte Spectrum Analysis Approach
In order to analyze the decoders in terms of composition, we inspect the decoder’s
structure in terms of bytes. The main elements used (Nops Area, Byte Spectrum and
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Other Bytes) are the same as defined in previous section 6.4. For each specific polymorphic
engine, the algorithm performs the following steps for each sets of population:
1. Separate the Byte Spectrum from possible NOP elements.
2. Identify the Nops Area of the decoder by counting the number of bytes being NOP
elements.
3. Identify the Byte Spectrum by counting the corresponding bytes.
4. Count the Other Bytes.
5. Compute the composition rates:













6. Record the compositions.
7. After analyzing all the population members, compute average compositions and stan-
dard deviation for each composition.
The composition rates will help us to better understand the bytes’ structure of a polymor-
phic decoder. After analyzing all the sets of population for a specific polymorphic engine,
we average the results to get a final composition. If the final compositions verify our pre-
vious assumptions, then we can effectively develop a model for recognizing decoders of
polymorphic engines in terms of byte composition.
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6.7 Results
The byte spectrum analysis gives us the following results. For Shikata Ga Nai, Table 6.4
illustrates the composition results for each of the previously described elements:
Table 6.4: Composition Results for Shikata Ga Nai
Sets Metrics Nops Area Byte Spectrum Other Bytes
1000 1 composition 0.59 0.183 0.22
standard dev 0.065 0.04 0.056
1000 2 composition 0.586 0.185 0.227
standard dev 0.068 0.04 0.06
1000 3 composition 0.588 0.184 0.227
standard dev 0.066 0.04 0.06
5000 1 composition 0.59 0.184 0.225
standard dev 0.065 0.04 0.057
5000 2 composition 0.59 0.184 0.2247
standard dev 0.06 0.04 0.057
5000 3 composition 0.59 0.184 0.224
standard dev 0.065 0.04 0.056
10000 1 composition 0.59 0.184 0.224
standard dev 0.065 0.04 0.056
10000 2 composition 0.5916 0.184 0.224
standard dev 0.066 0.04 0.057
10000 3 composition 0.59 0.184 0.224
standard dev 0.066 0.04 0.057
For ADMmutate, Table 6.5 illustrates the composition results for each of the previously
described elements:
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Table 6.5: Composition Results for ADMmutate
Sets Metrics Nops Area Byte Spectrum Other Bytes
1000 1 composition 0.545 0.313 0.1407
standard dev 0.06 0.051 0.044
1000 2 composition 0.553 0.308 0.14
standard dev 0.06 0.053 0.045
1000 3 composition 0.5505 0.309 0.14
standard dev 0.061 0.052 0.043
5000 1 composition 0.548 0.309 0.142
standard dev 0.061 0.053 0.045
5000 2 composition 0.548 0.31 0.141
standard dev 0.061 0.05 0.045
5000 3 composition 0.549 0.308 0.1415
standard dev 0.061 0.0532 0.045
10000 1 composition 0.555 0.309 0.141
standard dev 0.061 0.0529 0.045
10000 2 composition 0.55 0.303 0.1408
standard dev 0.061 0.052 0.045
10000 3 composition 0.55 0.309 0.1402
standard dev 0.061 0.052 0.047
For Tapion, Table 6.6 illustrates the composition results for each of the previously
described elements:
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Table 6.6: Composition Results for Tapion
Sets Metrics Nops Area Byte Spectrum Other Bytes
1000 1 composition 0.372 0.4086 0.22
standard dev 0.029 0.0258 0.023
1000 2 composition 0.37 0.4098 0.22
standard dev 0.029 0.025 0.0226
1000 3 composition 0.369 0.4095 0.22
standard dev 0.029 0.0276 0.0234
5000 1 composition 0.37 0.409 0.22
standard dev 0.029 0.026 0.023
5000 2 composition 0.369 0.41 0.22
standard dev 0.028 0.0257 0.0232
5000 3 composition 0.3711 0.409 0.219
standard dev 0.029 0.0262 0.0232
10000 1 composition 0.3703 0.409 0.22
standard dev 0.029 0.026 0.023
10000 2 composition 0.3709 0.409 0.219
standard dev 0.029 0.026 0.02276
10000 3 composition 0.3704 0.409 0.219
standard dev 0.029 0.0259 0.023
The average composition results for each engine are summarized in the following Table
6.7:
Table 6.7: Average Composition Results for the Engines
Engine Metrics Nops Area Byte Spectrum Other Bytes
Shikata Ga Nai composition 0.589 0.184 0.224
standard dev 0.065 0.026 0.057
ADMmutate composition 0.549 0.309 0.1407
standard dev 0.061 0.052 0.0448
Tapion composition 0.37 0.409 0.219
standard dev 0.028 0.026 0.023
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6.8 Interpretation
The first observation that we can make is that the standard-deviations are very low for
all engines across all sets of population generated. Thus, somehow we can assess the re-
liability of the results. Our first assumption, which states that either the Nops Area or
Byte Spectrum should be the elements in excess (in terms of composition) is verified. We
can see that even when the Nops Area elements are in excess, we can differentiate it from
a regular NOP section. A NOP section is exclusively composed of NOPS and thus have
a composition of 100%. We can also observe that the amount of Byte Spectrum is never
null and that its amount is never below 15%. In other words, this amount is never low
(by low we mean being less than 5%). However, we still need to determine what we con-
sider as an acceptable amount of Byte Spectrum. Accordingly, the minimum threshold for
Byte Spectrum has to be defined in order to be able to differentiate it from any random se-
quence of bytes. The best way to do this is to repeat the experiment, for each polymorphic
engines’ Byte Spectrum elements, against regular network traffic, which provides us with
enough randomness for byte sequences. We analyze the composition of the network dumps
against the three Byte Spectrum retrieved from each polymorphic engine. It is important to
mention the fact that we analyze the composition of the data part of network packets, thus
stripping off the headers.
6.9 Network Traffic Results
The set up for network traffic analysis is the following: we record the traffic and generate
three sets of data. During the traffic generation, we diversify our activity. We mean by that
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consulting various web sites, cheking emails, connecting to SSH, FTP accounts, etc. The
aim is to generate network traffic with enough randomness. The traffic is recorded using a
regular sniffer and saved into a file. Then, we strip off the network headers keeping only
the data part. The composition results, for each network traffic, against the Byte Spectrum
elements retrieved from each polymorphic engine are summed up in the following tables.
Table 6.8, Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 illustrate the composition results of network traffics
against Byte Spectrum elements of respectively Shikata Ga Nai, ADMmutate and Tapion.
Table 6.8: Composition for Network Dumps Against Shikata Ga Nai Byte Spectrum
Network dumps Metrics Nops Area Byte Spectrum Other Bytes
network dump 1 composition 0.474 0.026 0.499
standard dev 0.092 0.014 0.09
network dump 2 composition 0.5 0.02 0.473
standard dev 0.1 0.013 0.1
network dump 3 composition 0.57 0.016 0.41
standard dev 0.091 0.014 0.093
Table 6.9: Composition for Network Dumps Against ADMmutate Byte Spectrum
Network dumps Metrics Nops Area Byte Spectrum Other Bytes
network dump 1 composition 0.47 0.0835 0.44
standard dev 0.091 0.036 0.073
network dump 2 composition 0.5 0.083 0.415
standard dev 0.1 0.045 0.07
network dump 3 composition 0.57 0.038 0.387
standard dev 0.09 0.023 0.088
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Table 6.10: Composition for Network Dumps Against Tapion Byte Spectrum
Network dumps Metrics Nops Area Byte Spectrum Other Bytes
network dump 1 composition 0.474 0.0612 0.46
standard dev 0.09 0.029 0.079
network dump 2 composition 0.5 0.05 0.447
standard dev 0.1 0.034 0.083
network dump 3 composition 0.57 0.037 0.38
standard dev 0.09 0.022 0.09
The average composition results, for each network traffic, against the Byte Spectrum
elements retrieved from each polymorphic engine are summarized in the following Table
6.11:
Table 6.11: Average Composition Results Against Engines’ Spectrums
Engine Metrics Nops Area Byte Spectrum Other Bytes
Shikata Ga Nai composition 0.51 0.062 0.462
standard dev 0.094 0.013 0.094
ADMmutate composition 0.51 0.068 0.414
standard dev 0.093 0.034 0.077
Tapion composition 0.51 0.0494 0.429
standard dev 0.093 0.085 0.084
6.10 Interpretation
We observe that the standard-deviations are very low (being less than 0.1), thus we can
assess the reliability of the results. An important observation that we can make is that the
Byte Spectrum elements are very low, which is a good sign since it can help us differentiate
polymorphic decoders’ compositions from any random sequence of bytes. We can also ob-
serve that the Byte Spectrum elements that we have extracted are really characterizing each
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of their respective polymorphic engine. Now we need to define the minimum threshold for
the Byte Spectrum element. Let R be
Byte Spectrum
Nops Area
ratio. The latter is computed for all
the engine Byte Spectrum against the network traffics. The same is done for the average
composition for each polymorphic engine. The corresponding results are summarized in
Table 6.12 and Table 6.13 .
Table 6.12: Ratios for Network Dumps Against Polymorphic Engines Byte Spectrums
Engine Ratio
Shikata Ga Nai 0.12
ADMmutate 0.133
Tapion 0.097
Table 6.13: Ratios for Polymorphic Engines Decoders’ Composition
Engine Ratio
Shikata Ga Nai 0.31
ADMmutate 0.56
Tapion 1.1
Regardless of the polymorphic engine analyzed, we always have a reasonable amount
of Byte Spectrum elements present in the composition. This can be observed in the ratios.
Thus, we can state that a polymorphic decoder should have its ration R such that: R > 0.15





6.11 Rules of Composition
Once the minimum threshold for the Byte Spectrum elements is computed, we can derive
characteristics, in terms of byte composition, that allow us to differentiate polymorphic
decoders from any other sequence of bytes:
1. Nops Area or Byte Spectrum should be the most present elements (in terms of com-
position)
2. Other Bytes could never be the most frequent elements
3. Nops Area < 0.9





In the following section, we verify the rules by testing them against all the sets of population
of the polymorphic engines.
6.12 Verification
In this section, we check for each polymorphic engine whether the rules hold. This is done
for the purpose of validating our previous conclusions. Table 6.14 to Table 6.16 show the
correlation rate for respectively Shikata Ga Nai, ADMmutate and Tapion .
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Table 6.14: Shikata Ga Nai Correlation for Composition










Table 6.15: ADMmutate Correlation for Composition











Table 6.16: Tapion Correlation for Composition










The average composition correlation rates are presented in Table 6.17 .
Table 6.17: Average Correlation for Composition
Engine Rate of correlation
Shikata Ga Nai 97.52%
ADMmutate 99.81%
Tapion 100%
One can notice that there are high percentages of correlation. This confirms that the
composition rules hold and that they can be used to characterize a decoder’s polymorphic
engine. However, in order to assess the validity of the results, we need to test these rules
against the network dumps for the three Byte Spectrum. If we get low percentages of corre-
lation, then we can confirm the fact that we can differentiate polymorphic engines’ decoders
from any random sequence of bytes. The obtained results are shown in Table 6.18 .
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Table 6.18: Composition Correlation for Network Dumps against Byte Spectrums
Network dumps Shikata Ga Nai ADM Tapion
network dump 1 0.003% 19% 4.1%
network dump 2 0.002% 22% 1.8%
network dump 3 0.007% 2.6% 2%
We can observe that the rates of correlation are very low. In other words, it is possible
to distinguish a polymorphic engine, in terms of byte composition since the network dumps
do not highly correlate with our rules of composition. This confirms the validity of the rules
for composition.
6.13 Conclusion
Our experiments have shown that indeed polymorphic engine decoders could be effec-
tively characterized in terms of byte composition. In addition, we showed that those de-
coders can be mapped by effectively predicting the areas that are subject to high mutations
as well as areas that correspond to the shape signatures. Thus, we are in a position to states




The main issue, when dealing with polymorphic shellcode, is to come up with a model that
is able to express a polymorphic behavior. We know, from [10,11,12,13] that those engines
leave artefacts even in their mutation processes due, mainly, to consistency constraints. We
also know that they are able to exhibit high degree of polymorphism. Having such informa-
tion in mind, we were able to develop a new concept of signature called Shape Signatures.
Our model detect the invariant parts, due to consistency constraints, as well as mutated part
due to polymorphism. In other words, instead of trying to extract traditional signatures for
which we know the number of signatures will be huge, we look for a “mould” or higher
model that can express all those possible instances that could be generated. This combina-
tion expresses the characteristics or abilities of polymorphic engines in a much better way
compared to traditional signature-based models who fail against them. We implemented a
genetic algorithm that takes in its fitness function the new approach to extract those shape
signatures. The testing was done against the most powerful polymorphic engines. At the
end, we are able to extract very reliable signatures.
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In an attempt of modeling polymorphic engines, we studied the bit positions of the newly
extracted signatures. The results were that we are able to effectively map the decoder by
predicting and locating precisely the areas subject to high mutation and areas that corre-
spond to shape signatures. The conclusions are that polymorphic engines’ shape signatures
do not explore the whole decoder’s dimensions (in terms of bit positions) but rather shift
in a defined area of the decoder. We also looked at the composition of the studied poly-
morphic engines in terms of bytes and showed that each one of them exhibit a specific byte
composition that uniquely characterizes it. In the experiments, we were able to extract con-
stant patterns, in terms of composition, against very large sets of decoders. Our modeling
demonstrate that polymorphic decoders do not look as random as they are.
We believe that the methods and mechanisms that were developed could truly help mod-
eling and better understanding how polymorphic decoders behave. We still believe that the
modeling could be enhanced by trying to look for shape signatures that represent the whole
decoder. By this, we mean, instead of extracting shape signatures for small portions of
the decoders, we could look for one shape signature that characterize the whole decoder.
Further work could be done on the Byte Spectrum or most repeated bytes extracted. This
is especially the case when it comes to analyzing their byte position (for the most repeated
bytes). For instance, one can observe that the byte EB for ADMmutate decoders is always
starting the decoder. For Shikata Ga Nai, we found that at position 17,20 and 23 of the
decoder, bytes 31, 03, 83 are always alternating at those specific positions. Consequently, a
mechanism for analyzing the bit positions of the most repeated bytes could be developed.
Furthermore improvement could be made by integrating all the concepts developed in this
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thesis into a framework of detection taking into consideration the shape signatures, the bits
position analysis, and the composition analysis. In addition to that, the work could be en-
hanced drastically by taking into account the effect of each used instructions. So far, in
the analysis, we have taken a high-level approach of polymorphic engines by only look-
ing at their bytes without relating to their implications in terms of what job they do. We
believe that by doing so, we can develop a framework, using advanced artificial intelli-
gence techniques, to better enhance modeling. Our concept of shape signatures, analysis
of the bits positions and the composition analysis are an initial contribution towards better
improvement in modeling polymorphic decoders. According to the experiments we real-
ized, it is really possible to model these engines since our approach is really showing some
promising results. Since polymorphic engine mutation techniques are becoming very pow-
erful, we think the main issue when it comes to detection is finding a way to better express
their polymorphic nature. The concept of shape signature is an initial contribution towards
developing more adequate ways but we truly believe that there is still of lot of room for
improvement regarding how we can express polymorphism into a form of detection.
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